探索人工通用智能的约束:一个博弈论不可能性定理
Exploring the Constraints on Artificial General Intelligence: A Game-Theoretic No-Go Theorem
AI总结:
本文提出博弈论框架,证明人类与超级智能体互动的四个关键假设不可能同时成立,并给出控制数据与开放研究的政策建议。
摘要:
日益复杂的人工智能(AI)系统的出现,因其在几乎所有领域超越人类智能和能力的潜力,引发了研究人员、政策制定者和公众之间的激烈辩论。在本文中,我提出了一个博弈论框架,用以刻画人类智能体与潜在的超级人类机器智能体之间的战略互动。我识别出四个关键假设:战略不可预测性、对机器策略的访问权、理性以及超级人类机器。本文的主要结果是一个不可能性定理:这四个假设在同时成立时是不一致的,但放松其中任何一个假设都会得到一组一致的假设。由此得出两条直接的政策建议:第一,政策制定者应控制对特定人类数据的访问,以维持战略不可预测性;第二,他们应授予选定的AI研究人员访问超级人类机器研究的权限,以确保对机器策略的访问权这一假设成立。我的分析有助于更好地理解可能塑造超级人类AI理论发展的背景。
英文摘要:
The emergence of increasingly sophisticated artificial intelligence (AI) systems have sparked intense debate among researchers, policymakers, and the public due to their potential to surpass human intelligence and capabilities in all domains. In this paper, I propose a game-theoretic framework that captures the strategic interactions between a human agent and a potential superhuman machine agent. I identify four key assumptions: Strategic Unpredictability, Access to Machine's Strategy, Rationality, and Superhuman Machine. The main result of this paper is an impossibility theorem: these four assumptions are inconsistent when taken together, but relaxing any one of them results in a consistent set of assumptions. Two straightforward policy recommendations follow: first, policymakers should control access to specific human data to maintain Strategic Unpredictability; and second, they should grant select AI researchers access to superhuman machine research to ensure Access to Machine's Strategy holds. My analysis contributes to a better understanding of the context that can shape the theoretical development of superhuman AI.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。