针对具有无意或恶意内部威胁的高级持续性威胁的防御
Defense for Advanced Persistent Threat with Inadvertent or Malicious Insider Threats
摘要:
在本文中,我们提出了一个博弈论的框架来研究两种类型的内部威胁:恶意和无意的高级持续威胁问题。在此框架下,建立了一个统一的三人博弈模型,得到了不同内部人的纳什均衡。通过分析纳什均衡,我们提供了定量的解决方案,先进的持续威胁问题的内部威胁。此外,最优防御策略和防御者的成本比较两个内部威胁已经执行。研究结果表明,防御者应该采用更积极的防御策略,对无意的内部威胁,而不是对恶意的内部威胁,尽管事实上,恶意的内部威胁成本的防御者更多。我们的理论分析验证了数值结果,包括不同的内部人采取的风险策略的条件的额外检查。这可以帮助防守者确定监控强度和防守策略。
英文摘要:
In this paper, we propose a game-theoretical framework to investigate advanced persistent threat problems with two types of insider threats: malicious and inadvertent. Within this framework, a unified three-player game is established and Nash equilibria are obtained in response to different insiders. By analyzing Nash equilibria, we provide quantitative solutions to the advanced persistent threat problems with insider threats. Furthermore, optimal defense strategy and defender's cost comparisons between two insider threats have been performed. The findings suggest that the defender should employ more active defense strategies against inadvertent insider threats than against malicious insider threats, despite the fact that malicious insider threats cost the defender more. Our theoretical analysis is validated by numerical results, including an additional examination of the conditions of the risky strategies adopted by different insiders. This may help the defender in determining monitoring intensities and defensive strategies.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。