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arXiv 2209.08416cs.GT
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模仿动态下劣势策略的生存

Survival of dominated strategies under imitation dynamics

Panayotis Mertikopoulos, Yannick Viossat

摘要:

进化博弈论的文献表明,被其他纯策略严格支配的纯策略在模仿博弈动态下总是会灭绝,但在创新动态下它们可以生存。正如我们所解释的,这是因为创新动力学倾向于稀有策略,而标准模仿动力学则不。然而,正如我们也表明,有合理的模仿协议,有利于罕见或频繁的战略,从而允许严格支配的战略,以生存在大类的模仿动态。支配策略可以持续在非平凡的频率,即使当支配的水平不小。

英文摘要:

The literature on evolutionary game theory suggests that pure strategies that are strictly dominated by other pure strategies always become extinct under imitative game dynamics, but they can survive under innovative dynamics. As we explain, this is because innovative dynamics favour rare strategies while standard imitative dynamics do not. However, as we also show, there are reasonable imitation protocols that favour rare or frequent strategies, thus allowing strictly dominated strategies to survive in large classes of imitation dynamics. Dominated strategies can persist at nontrivial frequencies even when the level of domination is not small.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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