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arXiv 2209.08211econ.GNq-fin.ECstat.AP
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教育政策中的地方政治控制:来自英格兰地方教育当局下放教师工资改革的证据

Local political control in educational policy: Evidence from decentralized teacher pay reform under England's local education authorities

Yiang Li, Xingzuo Zhou

摘要:

2012年,学校教师审查机构停止了中央指导,并允许学校自行决定英格兰教师的工资。与此同时,地方教育当局(LEAs)向LEAs控制的学校提供非法定教师薪酬建议。本研究探讨了如何LEAs的政党控制决定他们的指导,是否采用灵活的绩效工资或继续基于资历的工资。一个断点回归设计被用来解决政治控制和教育决策的内隐性。我们发现,边际保守控制的LEAs更倾向于建议以市场为导向的灵活的薪酬结构。结果对替代质量标准仍具有稳健性。本研究揭示了政治因素在英国地方教育政策制定中的重要性,这对未来的政策制定具有广泛的启示意义。

英文摘要:

In 2012, the School Teachers' Review Body discontinued central guidance and allowed school discretion in determining teachers' pay in England. Meanwhile, local education authorities (LEAs) offer non-statutory teacher pay recommendations to LEA-controlled schools. This study examines how LEAs' political party control determines their guidance regarding whether to adopt flexible performance pay or continue seniority-based pay. A regression discontinuity design is used to address the endogeneity of political control and educational policy-making. We find that marginally Conservative-controlled LEAs are more inclined to recommend market-oriented flexible pay structures. The results remain robust to alternative specifications. This study reveals that politics matter in England's local educational policy-making, which has broad implications for future policy.

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