With the advances in deep learning, speaker verification has achieved very high accuracy and is gaining popularity as a type of biometric authentication option in many scenes of our daily life, especially the growing market of web services. Compared to traditional passwords, "vocal passwords" are much more convenient as they relieve people from memorizing different passwords. However, new machine learning attacks are putting these voice authentication systems at risk. Without a strong security guarantee, attackers could access legitimate users' web accounts by fooling the deep neural network (DNN) based voice recognition models. In this paper, we demonstrate an easy-to-implement data poisoning attack to the voice authentication system, which can hardly be captured by existing defense mechanisms. Thus, we propose a more robust defense method, called Guardian, which is a convolutional neural network-based discriminator. The Guardian discriminator integrates a series of novel techniques including bias reduction, input augmentation, and ensemble learning. Our approach is able to distinguish about 95% of attacked accounts from normal accounts, which is much more effective than existing approaches with only 60% accuracy.
McMaster University(麦克马斯特大学);Vector Institute for Artificial Intelligence(矢量人工智能研究所)
In this paper we use game theory to model poisoning attack scenarios. We prove the non-existence of pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in the attacker and defender game. We then propose a mixed extension of our game model and an algorithm to approximate the Nash Equilibrium strategy for the defender. We then demonstrate the effectiveness of the mixed defence strategy generated by the algorithm, in an experiment.
Defending Against Sophisticated Poisoning Attacks with RL-based Aggregation in Federated Learning
Beijing Advanced Innovation Center for Future Blockchain and Privacy Computing(北京未来区块链与隐私计算高精尖创新中心);Institute of Artificial Intelligence, Beihang University(北京航空航天大学人工智能研究院)
Defending Against Poisoning Attacks in Federated Learning with Blockchain
Shanghai Artificial Intelligence Laboratory(上海人工智能实验室);Imperial College London(帝国理工学院);UiT The Arctic University of Norway(挪威北极大学);Carnegie Mellon University(卡内基梅隆大学);Mohamed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence(穆罕默德·本·扎耶德人工智能大学)
Support Vector Machines (SVMs) are vulnerable to targeted training data manipulations such as poisoning attacks and label flips. By carefully manipulating a subset of training samples, the attacker forces the learner to compute an incorrect decision boundary, thereby cause misclassifications. Considering the increased importance of SVMs in engineering and life-critical applications, we develop a novel defense algorithm that improves resistance against such attacks. Local Intrinsic Dimensionality (LID) is a promising metric that characterizes the outlierness of data samples. In this work, we in…
Shanghai Jiao Tong University(上海交通大学);Hangzhou Normal University(杭州师范大学);Shanghai Normal University(上海师范大学)
Federated learning (FL) provides an emerging approach for collaboratively training semantic encoder/decoder models of semantic communication systems, without private user data leaving the devices. Most existing studies on trustworthy FL aim to eliminate data poisoning threats that are produced by malicious clients, but in many cases, eliminating model poisoning attacks brought by fake servers is also an important objective. In this paper, a certificateless authentication-based trustworthy federated learning (CATFL) framework is proposed, which mutually authenticates the identity of clients and…
The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology(香港科技大学)
Federated learning is vulnerable to various attacks, such as model poisoning and backdoor attacks, even if some existing defense strategies are used. To address this challenge, we propose an attack-adaptive aggregation strategy to defend against various attacks for robust federated learning. The proposed approach is based on training a neural network with an attention mechanism that learns the vulnerability of federated learning models from a set of plausible attacks. To the best of our knowledge, our aggregation strategy is the first one that can be adapted to defend against various attacks i…
The Ohio State University(俄亥俄州立大学);Duke University(杜克大学)
In federated learning, multiple client devices jointly learn a machine learning model: each client device maintains a local model for its local training dataset, while a master device maintains a global model via aggregating the local models from the client devices. The machine learning community recently proposed several federated learning methods that were claimed to be robust against Byzantine failures (e.g., system failures, adversarial manipulations) of certain client devices. In this work, we perform the first systematic study on local model poisoning attacks to federated learning. We as…
FedMID: A Data-Free Method for Using Intermediate Outputs as a Defense Mechanism Against Poisoning Attacks in Federated Learning
School of Computing, KAIST(韩国科学技术院计算机学院);Samsung Research(三星研究院);Data Science Group, Institute for Basic Science(基础科学研究院数据科学组);Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy(马克斯·普朗克安全与隐私研究所)
The Pennsylvania State University(宾夕法尼亚州立大学);Duke University(杜克大学)
Data poisoning attacks spoof a recommender system to make arbitrary, attacker-desired recommendations via injecting fake users with carefully crafted rating scores into the recommender system. We envision a cat-and-mouse game for such data poisoning attacks and their defenses, i.e., new defenses are designed to defend against existing attacks and new attacks are designed to break them. To prevent such a cat-and-mouse game, we propose PORE, the first framework to build provably robust recommender systems in this work. PORE can transform any existing recommender system to be provably robust agai…
Machine learning models are vulnerable to data-poisoning attacks, in which an attacker maliciously modifies the training set to change the prediction of a learned model. In a trigger-less attack, the attacker can modify the training set but not the test inputs, while in a backdoor attack the attacker can also modify test inputs. Existing model-agnostic defense approaches either cannot handle backdoor attacks or do not provide effective certificates (i.e., a proof of a defense). We present BagFlip, a model-agnostic certified approach that can effectively defend against both trigger-less and bac…
Khoury College of Computer Sciences, Northeastern University(东北大学Khoury计算机科学学院)
Machine learning systems are deployed in critical settings, but they might fail in unexpected ways, impacting the accuracy of their predictions. Poisoning attacks against machine learning induce adversarial modification of data used by a machine learning algorithm to selectively change its output when it is deployed. In this work, we introduce a novel data poisoning attack called a \emph{subpopulation attack}, which is particularly relevant when datasets are large and diverse. We design a modular framework for subpopulation attacks, instantiate it with different building blocks, and show that …
Deep learning models have achieved high performance on many tasks, and thus have been applied to many security-critical scenarios. For example, deep learning-based face recognition systems have been used to authenticate users to access many security-sensitive applications like payment apps. Such usages of deep learning systems provide the adversaries with sufficient incentives to perform attacks against these systems for their adversarial purposes. In this work, we consider a new type of attacks, called backdoor attacks, where the attacker's goal is to create a backdoor into a learning-based a…
University of South Florida(南佛罗里达大学);U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory(美国空军研究实验室)
Deep neural networks usually require large labeled datasets for training to achieve state-of-the-art performance in many tasks, such as image classification and natural language processing. Although a lot of data is created each day by active Internet users, most of these data are unlabeled and are vulnerable to data poisoning attacks. In this paper, we develop an efficient active learning method that requires fewer labeled instances and incorporates the technique of adversarial retraining in which additional labeled artificial data are generated without increasing the budget of the labeling. …
Machine learning systems trained on user-provided data are susceptible to data poisoning attacks, whereby malicious users inject false training data with the aim of corrupting the learned model. While recent work has proposed a number of attacks and defenses, little is understood about the worst-case loss of a defense in the face of a determined attacker. We address this by constructing approximate upper bounds on the loss across a broad family of attacks, for defenders that first perform outlier removal followed by empirical risk minimization. Our approximation relies on two assumptions: (1) …
University of Oxford(牛津大学);Imperial College London(帝国理工学院);McGill University(麦吉尔大学)
Federated learning (FL) is a promising way to allow multiple data owners (clients) to collaboratively train machine learning models without compromising data privacy. Yet, existing FL solutions usually rely on a centralized aggregator for model weight aggregation, while assuming clients are honest. Even if data privacy can still be preserved, the problem of single-point failure and data poisoning attack from malicious clients remains unresolved. To tackle this challenge, we propose to use distributed ledger technology (DLT) to achieve FLock, a secure and reliable decentralized Federated Learni…
University of Louisville(路易斯维尔大学);North Carolina State University(北卡罗来纳州立大学);University of Wisconsin-Whitewater(威斯康星大学怀特沃特分校);Wayne State University(韦恩州立大学);The Ohio State University(俄亥俄州立大学);IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center(IBM托马斯·J·沃森研究中心);Duke University(杜克大学)
Federated learning (FL) provides autonomy and privacy by design to participating peers, who cooperatively build a machine learning (ML) model while keeping their private data in their devices. However, that same autonomy opens the door for malicious peers to poison the model by conducting either untargeted or targeted poisoning attacks. The label-flipping (LF) attack is a targeted poisoning attack where the attackers poison their training data by flipping the labels of some examples from one class (i.e., the source class) to another (i.e., the target class). Unfortunately, this attack is easy …
University of Maryland, College Park(马里兰大学帕克分校);University of Wisconsin-Madison(威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校);University of Toronto(多伦多大学);Vector Institute(向量研究所)
Machine learning algorithms are vulnerable to data poisoning attacks. Prior taxonomies that focus on specific scenarios, e.g., indiscriminate or targeted, have enabled defenses for the corresponding subset of known attacks. Yet, this introduces an inevitable arms race between adversaries and defenders. In this work, we study the feasibility of an attack-agnostic defense relying on artifacts that are common to all poisoning attacks. Specifically, we focus on a common element between all attacks: they modify gradients computed to train the model. We identify two main artifacts of gradients compu…
University of Florida(佛罗里达大学);The University of Manchester(曼彻斯特大学)
In this work, we study the possibility of defending against data-poisoning attacks while training a shallow neural network in a regression setup. We focus on doing supervised learning for a class of depth-2 finite-width neural networks, which includes single-filter convolutional networks. In this class of networks, we attempt to learn the network weights in the presence of a malicious oracle doing stochastic, bounded and additive adversarial distortions on the true output during training. For the non-gradient stochastic algorithm that we construct, we prove worst-case near-optimal trade-offs a…
Recent research has successfully demonstrated new types of data poisoning attacks. To address this problem, some researchers have proposed both offline and online data poisoning detection defenses which employ machine learning algorithms to identify such attacks. In this work, we take a different approach to preventing data poisoning attacks which relies on cryptographically-based authentication and provenance to ensure the integrity of the data used to train a machine learning model. The same approach is also used to prevent software poisoning and model poisoning attacks. A software poisoning…
The Ohio State University(俄亥俄州立大学);Duke University(杜克大学);Air Force Research Laboratory(空军研究实验室)
Federated learning (FL) is an emerging machine learning paradigm, in which clients jointly learn a model with the help of a cloud server. A fundamental challenge of FL is that the clients are often heterogeneous, e.g., they have different computing powers, and thus the clients may send model updates to the server with substantially different delays. Asynchronous FL aims to address this challenge by enabling the server to update the model once any client's model update reaches it without waiting for other clients' model updates. However, like synchronous FL, asynchronous FL is also vulnerable t…
Key Laboratory of Aerospace Information Security and Trusted Computing, Ministry of Education, the School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Wuhan University(武汉大学网络空间安全学院、教育部航空航天信息安全与可信计算重点实验室);Hubei Engineering Research Center on Big Data Security, School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Huazhong University of Science and Technology(华中科技大学网络空间安全学院、湖北省大数据安全工程研究中心);School of Computer Science, Wuhan University(武汉大学计算机学院);State Key Laboratory of Mathematical Engineering and Advanced Computing(数学工程与先进计算国家重点实验室);VMware, Inc.(VMware公司)
Collaborative learning allows multiple clients to train a joint model without sharing their data with each other. Each client performs training locally and then submits the model updates to a central server for aggregation. Since the server has no visibility into the process of generating the updates, collaborative learning is vulnerable to poisoning attacks where a malicious client can generate a poisoned update to introduce backdoor functionality to the joint model. The existing solutions for detecting poisoned updates, however, fail to defend against the recently proposed attacks, especiall…
Gradient Purification: Defense Against Poisoning Attack in Decentralized Federated Learning
Center for Data Science, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310000, China(数据科学中心,浙江大学,杭州);College of Computer Science, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310000, China(计算机科学学院,浙江大学,杭州)
Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications(北京邮电大学);Beihang University(北京航空航天大学);The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology(香港科技大学);Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications(重庆邮电大学)
Defending Against Beta Poisoning Attacks in Machine Learning Models
Department of Computer Engineering Acıbadem University Istanbul, Turkiye(计算机工程系 阿克萨德梅大学 伊斯坦布尔,土耳其);Department of Computer Engineering Koç University Istanbul, Turkiye(计算机工程系 科大学 伊斯坦布尔,土耳其)
Shiraz University of Technology(设拉子理工大学);University of Padua(帕多瓦大学);Ryerson University(瑞尔森大学)
Label manipulation attacks are a subclass of data poisoning attacks in adversarial machine learning used against different applications, such as malware detection. These types of attacks represent a serious threat to detection systems in environments having high noise rate or uncertainty, such as complex networks and Internet of Thing (IoT). Recent work in the literature has suggested using the $K$-Nearest Neighboring (KNN) algorithm to defend against such attacks. However, such an approach can suffer from low to wrong detection accuracy. In this paper, we design an architecture to tackle the …
College of Computer Science and Technology, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics(南京航空航天大学计算机科学与技术学院);School of Science and Engineering, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen(香港中文大学(深圳)理工学院);Shenzhen Institute of Artificial Intelligence and Robotics for Society (AIRS)(深圳市人工智能与机器人研究院)
Federated learning (FL) is a promising privacy-preserving distributed machine learning methodology that allows multiple clients (i.e., workers) to collaboratively train statistical models without disclosing private training data. Due to the characteristics of data remaining localized and the uninspected on-device training process, there may exist Byzantine workers launching data poisoning and model poisoning attacks, which would seriously deteriorate model performance or prevent the model from convergence. Most of the existing Byzantine-robust FL schemes are either ineffective against several …
The rapidly expanding number of Internet of Things (IoT) devices is generating huge quantities of data, but the data privacy and security exposure in IoT devices, especially in the automatic driving system. Federated learning (FL) is a paradigm that addresses data privacy, security, access rights, and access to heterogeneous message issues by integrating a global model based on distributed nodes. However, data poisoning attacks on FL can undermine the benefits, destroying the global model's availability and disrupting model training. To avoid the above issues, we build up a hierarchical defens…
University of Science and Technology of China(中国科学技术大学)
Adversarial machine learning has attracted a great amount of attention in recent years. In a poisoning attack, the adversary can inject a small number of specially crafted samples into the training data which make the decision boundary severely deviate and cause unexpected misclassification. Due to the great importance and popular use of support vector machines (SVM), we consider defending SVM against poisoning attacks in this paper. We study two commonly used strategies for defending: designing robust SVM algorithms and data sanitization. Though several robust SVM algorithms have been propose…
Fraunhofer AISEC(弗劳恩霍夫应用集成安全研究所);Technical University of Munich(慕尼黑工业大学)
Data poisoning is one of the most relevant security threats against machine learning and data-driven technologies. Since many applications rely on untrusted training data, an attacker can easily craft malicious samples and inject them into the training dataset to degrade the performance of machine learning models. As recent work has shown, such Denial-of-Service (DoS) data poisoning attacks are highly effective. To mitigate this threat, we propose a new approach of detecting DoS poisoned instances. In comparison to related work, we deviate from clustering and anomaly detection based approaches…