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arXiv 2208.08348econ.THstat.AP
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禁止盒子?信息、激励与统计歧视

Ban The Box? Information, Incentives, and Statistical Discrimination

John W. Patty, Elizabeth Maggie Penn

摘要:

“禁止”是指一项政策运动,旨在禁止雇主索取可用于在统计上歧视各类申请人(特别是有犯罪记录的申请人)的申请人信息。在这篇文章中,我们研究如何隐藏或透露信息功能的申请人的身份直接影响招聘,并在平衡,可能会改变申请人的动机,投资于人力资本。我们表明,存在的情况下,雇主和申请人都同意是否禁止框。具体而言,根据劳动力市场的结构,禁止盒子可以是(1)帕累托支配,(2)帕累托支配,(3)有利于申请人而损害雇主,或(4)有利于雇主而损害申请人。我们的研究结果对政策的影响超越了就业决策,包括房东使用信用检查和大学入学标准化考试。

英文摘要:

"Banning the Box" refers to a policy campaign aimed at prohibiting employers from soliciting applicant information that could be used to statistically discriminate against categories of applicants (in particular, those with criminal records). In this article, we examine how the concealing or revealing of informative features about an applicant's identity affects hiring both directly and, in equilibrium, by possibly changing applicants' incentives to invest in human capital. We show that there exist situations in which an employer and an applicant are in agreement about whether to ban the box. Specifically, depending on the structure of the labor market, banning the box can be (1) Pareto dominant, (2) Pareto dominated, (3) benefit the applicant while harming the employer, or (4) benefit the employer while harming the applicant. Our results have policy implications spanning beyond employment decisions, including the use of credit checks by landlords and standardized tests in college admissions.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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