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arXiv 2208.07006cs.GTcs.LOcs.MA
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合作与不合作的制度设计:开源博弈论中的惊喜与问题

Cooperative and uncooperative institution designs: Surprises and problems in open-source game theory

Andrew Critch, Michael Dennis, Stuart Russell

摘要:

现实世界的代理,如基于软件的代理或人类机构,越来越有可能查看与它们交互的其他代理的内部编程。例如,一家公司可以读取另一家公司的章程,或者一个软件系统可以读取另一个软件系统的源代码。这种代理的设计者之间的博弈论均衡被称为\emph{program equilibria},我们称这个区域为\emph{open-source game theory}。在这项工作中,我们展示了一系列违反直觉的结果,开源游戏,这是独立的程序设计语言,代理人写的。我们表明,某些正式的制度设计,人们可能会期望背叛对方,而不是变成合作,或相反,合作时,人们可能会期望他们背叛。在每个机构都能充分了解另一个机构的真正运作程序的情况下,结果是成立的。我们还展示了例子和十个开放的问题,以更好地理解这些现象。我们认为,当代博弈论仍然装备不足,研究程序均衡,因为即使是在开源环境中的单个游戏的结果仍然违反直觉和知之甚少。尽管如此,这些开源代理中的一些表现出理想的特性-例如,它们可以不可利用地为其他代理人的合作和易读性创造激励,因此分析它们可以产生相当大的好处。

英文摘要:

It is increasingly possible for real-world agents, such as software-based agents or human institutions, to view the internal programming of other such agents that they interact with. For instance, a company can read the bylaws of another company, or one software system can read the source code of another. Game-theoretic equilibria between the designers of such agents are called \emph{program equilibria}, and we call this area \emph{open-source game theory}. In this work we demonstrate a series of counterintuitive results on open-source games, which are independent of the programming language in which agents are written. We show that certain formal institution designs that one might expect to defect against each other will instead turn out to cooperate, or conversely, cooperate when one might expect them to defect. The results hold in a setting where each institution has full visibility into the other institution's true operating procedures. We also exhibit examples and ten open problems for better understanding these phenomena. We argue that contemporary game theory remains ill-equipped to study program equilibria, given that even the outcomes of single games in open-source settings remain counterintuitive and poorly understood. Nonetheless, some of these open-source agents exhibit desirable characteristics -- e.g., they can unexploitably create incentives for cooperation and legibility from other agents -- such that analyzing them could yield considerable benefits.

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