玩具不能玩：Spekkens理论中的物理代理人
Toys can't play: physical agents in Spekkens' theory
摘要：
信息是物理的，而对于一个具有普适性的物理理论，它应该将观察者建模为物理系统，具有具体的记忆，它们存储通过实验和推理获得的信息。在这里，我们解决这些问题，在Spekkens的玩具理论，非上下文的认知限制模型，部分模仿的行为量子力学。我们提出了一种方法来模拟代理，记忆，测量，条件动作和信息处理的物理实现。我们发现，玩具代理人的行动是严重限制：虽然有非正交状态的理论，有没有办法为物理代理人有意识地准备他们。他们的记忆也受到限制：智能体不能忘记系统处于两个任意状态中的哪一个。最后，我们形式化的过程中作出推断其他代理的实验和模型多代理实验像维格纳的朋友。与量子理论或盒子世界不同，在玩具理论中，当物理主体对彼此的知识进行推理时，不存在不一致。
英文摘要：
Information is physical, and for a physical theory to be universal, it should model observers as physical systems, with concrete memories where they store the information acquired through experiments and reasoning. Here we address these issues in Spekkens' toy theory, a non-contextual epistemically restricted model that partially mimics the behaviour of quantum mechanics. We propose a way to model physical implementations of agents, memories, measurements, conditional actions and information processing. We find that the actions of toy agents are severely limited: although there are non-orthogonal states in the theory, there is no way for physical agents to consciously prepare them. Their memories are also constrained: agents cannot forget in which of two arbitrary states a system is. Finally, we formalize the process of making inferences about other agents' experiments and model multi-agent experiments like Wigner's friend. Unlike quantum theory or box world, in the toy theory there are no inconsistencies when physical agents reason about each other's knowledge.
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