地中海中部移民和走私者的战略选择
Strategic Choices of Migrants and Smugglers in the Central Mediterranean Sea
摘要：
从利比亚到意大利的海上通道是世界上最危险和最具政治争议的移民路线之一，但自2014年以来，已有50多万人试图穿越。利用关于总移民流量和个人移民事件的数据，我们估计移民和走私者如何应对边境执法的变化，即从2017年开始利比亚海岸警卫队拦截的增加以及海上救援概率的相应下降。我们发现支持的威慑作用，其中沿地中海中部路线的企图过境下降，和分流的影响，其中一些移民替代西地中海路线。与此同时，走私者调整了他们的策略。使用的走私者的选择的船的大小的战略模型，我们估计走私者之间的短期回报，以推出过度拥挤的船只和长期成本，使不太成功的交叉尝试下不同程度的执法之间的权衡。总之，这些分析揭示了事件和流量级数据集的整合如何为正在进行的移民政策辩论提供信息，并确定不断变化的执法制度的潜在后果。
英文摘要：
The sea crossing from Libya to Italy is one of the world's most dangerous and politically contentious migration routes, and yet over half a million people have attempted the crossing since 2014. Leveraging data on aggregate migration flows and individual migration incidents, we estimate how migrants and smugglers have reacted to changes in border enforcement, namely the rise in interceptions by the Libyan Coast Guard starting in 2017 and the corresponding decrease in the probability of rescue at sea. We find support for a deterrence effect in which attempted crossings along the Central Mediterranean route declined, and a diversion effect in which some migrants substituted to the Western Mediterranean route. At the same time, smugglers adapted their tactics. Using a strategic model of the smuggler's choice of boat size, we estimate how smugglers trade off between the short-run payoffs to launching overcrowded boats and the long-run costs of making less successful crossing attempts under different levels of enforcement. Taken together, these analyses shed light on how the integration of incident- and flow-level datasets can inform ongoing migration policy debates and identify potential consequences of changing enforcement regimes.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
