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arXiv 2207.04145cs.CR
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针对Mesh消息传递的强大安全性

Strong Anonymity for Mesh Messaging

Neil Perry, Bruce Spang, Saba Eskandarian, Dan Boneh

摘要:

在政府中断互联网连接后,世界各地的抗议者都在使用由通过蓝牙通信的智能手机组成的网状网络上构建的消息传递系统。不幸的是,现有的系统已被证明是不安全的;最令人担忧的是没有充分隐藏元数据。这由于诸如蓝牙的无线通信本质上是广播介质的事实而进一步复杂。在本文中,我们提出了一个新的威胁模型,捕捉示威者在这种情况下的安全要求。然后,我们提供了一个解决方案,满足所需的安全属性,隐藏所有相关的元数据,规模适度的抗议,并支持组消息。这是通过以限制重复消息的开销的方式广播所有消息来实现的,确保密文不会泄漏元数据,并限制通过观察用户行为可以了解的内容。我们还建立了一个系统模型,并对其进行数值评估,以支持我们的主张,并分析它支持多少用户。最后,我们讨论进一步的扩展,消除潜在的瓶颈扩展和支持更多的用户。

英文摘要:

Messaging systems built on mesh networks consisting of smartphones communicating over Bluetooth have been used by protesters around the world after governments have disrupted Internet connectivity. Unfortunately, existing systems have been shown to be insecure; most concerningly by not adequately hiding metadata. This is further complicated by the fact that wireless communication such as Bluetooth is inherently a broadcasting medium. In this paper, we present a new threat model that captures the security requirements of protesters in this setting. We then provide a solution that satisfies the required security properties, hides all relevant metadata, scales to moderately sized protests, and supports group messaging. This is achieved by broadcasting all messages in a way that limits the overhead of duplicate messages, ensuring that ciphertexts do not leak metadata, and limiting what can be learned by observing user behavior. We also build a model of our system and numerically evaluate it to support our claims and analyze how many users it supports. Finally, we discuss further extensions that remove potential bottlenecks in scaling and support substantially more users.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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