短期记忆下的声誉效应
Reputation Effects under Short Memories
摘要:
我分析了一个新的声誉之间的游戏一个耐心的卖家和近视的消费者,在消费者的记忆有限,不知道的确切顺序的卖家的行动序列。我关注的情况下,每个消费者只观察的次数,卖方采取了他的每一个行动,在过去的K期。当收益是单调超模的,我表明,耐心的卖家可以近似地确保他的承诺在所有均衡,只要K至少是1。我还表明,消费者可以近似地达到他们的第一个最好的福利在所有的均衡当且仅当他们的记忆长度K低于某个截止。虽然更长的记忆使更多的消费者能够在卖家偷懒时惩罚卖家,但一旦他们观察到卖家偷懒,就会削弱他们惩罚卖家的动机
英文摘要:
I analyze a novel reputation game between a patient seller and a sequence of myopic consumers, in which the consumers have limited memories and do not know the exact sequence of the seller's actions. I focus on the case where each consumer only observes the number of times that the seller took each of his actions in the last K periods. When payoffs are monotone-supermodular, I show that the patient seller can approximately secure his commitment payoff in all equilibria as long as K is at least one. I also show that the consumers can approximately attain their first-best welfare in all equilibria if and only if their memory length K is lower than some cutoff. Although a longer memory enables more consumers to punish the seller once the seller shirks, it weakens their incentives to punish the seller once they observe him shirking
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