Lalaine:大规模衡量和表征Apple隐私标签的违规行为
Lalaine: Measuring and Characterizing Non-Compliance of Apple Privacy Labels at Scale
摘要:
作为众所周知的冗长且难以阅读的隐私政策的关键补充,Apple推出了应用程序隐私标签,据称可以帮助用户更容易地了解应用程序的隐私做法。然而,虚假和误导性的隐私标签可能会欺骗注重隐私的消费者下载数据密集型应用程序,最终侵蚀标签的可信度和完整性。尽管苹果发布了应用开发者创建隐私标签的要求和指导方针,但外界对隐私标签是否以及在多大程度上是正确和合规的,反映了iOS应用的实际数据做法知之甚少。本文提出了第一个系统的研究,基于我们的新方法命名为Lalaine,评估数据流的隐私标签(流到标签)的一致性。Lalaine分析了5,102个iOS应用程序的隐私标签和二进制文件,揭示了隐私标签违规的普遍性和严重性。我们提供详细的案例研究,并分析隐私标签不合规的根本原因,以补充先前的理解。这为改进隐私标签设计和合规性要求带来了新的见解,因此应用程序开发人员,平台利益相关者和政策制定者可以更好地实现其隐私和问责制目标。Lalaine是彻底评估其高效率和有效性。我们负责任地向利益相关者报告结果。
英文摘要:
As a key supplement to privacy policies that are known to be lengthy and difficult to read, Apple has launched the app privacy labels, which purportedly help users more easily understand an app's privacy practices. However, false and misleading privacy labels can dupe privacy-conscious consumers into downloading data-intensive apps, ultimately eroding the credibility and integrity of the labels. Although Apple releases requirements and guidelines for app developers to create privacy labels, little is known about whether and to what extent the privacy labels in the wild are correct and compliant, reflecting the actual data practices of iOS apps. This paper presents the first systematic study, based on our new methodology named Lalaine, to evaluate data-flow to privacy-label (flow-to-label) consistency. Lalaine analyzed the privacy labels and binaries of 5,102 iOS apps, shedding light on the prevalence and seriousness of privacy-label non-compliance. We provide detailed case studies and analyze root causes for privacy label non-compliance that complements prior understandings. This has led to new insights for improving privacy-label design and compliance requirements, so app developers, platform stakeholders, and policy-makers can better achieve their privacy and accountability goals. Lalaine is thoroughly evaluated for its high effectiveness and efficiency. We are responsibly reporting the results to stakeholders.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。