在去中心化失败期间,一个匿名团体之间的合作保护了比特币
Cooperation among an anonymous group protected Bitcoin during failures of decentralization
摘要:
比特币是一种数字货币,旨在依赖于一个分散的,不可信的匿名代理网络。使用敏感性>99%、特异性>99%的假名地址链接程序,我们发现,从推出(2009年1月3日)到价格达到1美元(2011年2月9日)期间,大多数比特币被开采只有64名代理人。这是由于比特币收入中帕累托分布的迅速出现,产生了如此广泛的资源集中化,几乎所有当代比特币地址都可以通过六个交易链连接到这些顶级代理。中央集权造成了一种社会困境。攻击者可以通过“51%攻击”来利用比特币,这使得他们可以重复使用相同的比特币。这样做会伤害社区。引人注目的是,我们发现潜在的攻击者总是选择合作。我们使用一个N人蜈蚣游戏来模拟这种困境,在这个游戏中,匿名玩家可以选择利用,从而破坏,一个欣赏的好。结合理论和经济实验,我们表明,即使个人的收益不变,合作是更频繁的游戏时,由一个匿名的群体。尽管比特币的设计依赖于一个分散的、不信任的匿名代理网络,但它的早期成功却依赖于一小群利他主义创始人之间的合作。
英文摘要:
Bitcoin is a digital currency designed to rely on a decentralized, trustless network of anonymous agents. Using a pseudonymous-address-linking procedure that achieves >99% sensitivity and >99% specificity, we reveal that between launch (January 3rd, 2009), and when the price reached $1 (February 9th, 2011), most bitcoin was mined by only sixty-four agents. This was due to the rapid emergence of Pareto distributions in bitcoin income, producing such extensive resource centralization that almost all contemporary bitcoin addresses can be connected to these top agents by a chain of six transactions. Centralization created a social dilemma. Attackers could routinely exploit bitcoin via a "51% attack", making it possible for them to repeatedly spend the same bitcoins. Yet doing so would harm the community. Strikingly, we find that potential attackers always chose to cooperate instead. We model this dilemma using an N-player Centipede game in which anonymous players can choose to exploit, and thereby undermine, an appreciating good. Combining theory and economic experiments, we show that, even when individual payoffs are unchanged, cooperation is more frequent when the game is played by an anonymous group. Although bitcoin was designed to rely on a decentralized, trustless network of anonymous agents, its early success rested instead on cooperation among a small group of altruistic founders.
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