半战略专家的分散式更新选择
Decentralised Update Selection with Semi-Strategic Experts
摘要:
受区块链应用中采用的治理模型的启发,我们研究了以分散的方式选择适当的系统更新的问题。与大多数现有的投票方法相反,我们使用一组具有不同专业知识水平的有动机的专家的输入。特别是,我们开发了一个批准投票启发的选择机制,通过该机制,专家批准或不批准不同的更新,根据他们的看法,每个替代品的质量。考虑到他们的意见,并根据他们的专业水平进行加权,然后执行和评估单个更新,专家根据他们的选择获得奖励。我们发现,这种机制总是有近似的纯纳什均衡,这些实现了一个常数因子近似的最佳替代品的质量基准。最后,我们研究了问题的重复版本,其中专家的权重在每次更新后根据其性能进行调整。在对权重的温和假设下,我们的机制的扩展仍然具有近似的纯纳什均衡。
英文摘要:
Motivated by governance models adopted in blockchain applications, we study the problem of selecting appropriate system updates in a decentralised way. Contrary to most existing voting approaches, we use the input of a set of motivated experts of varying levels of expertise. In particular, we develop an approval voting inspired selection mechanism through which the experts approve or disapprove the different updates according to their perception of the quality of each alternative. Given their opinions, and weighted by their expertise level, a single update is then implemented and evaluated, and the experts receive rewards based on their choices. We show that this mechanism always has approximate pure Nash equilibria and that these achieve a constant factor approximation with respect to the quality benchmark of the optimal alternative. Finally, we study the repeated version of the problem, where the weights of the experts are adjusted after each update, according to their performance. Under mild assumptions about the weights, the extension of our mechanism still has approximate pure Nash equilibria in this setting.
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