监督性证明检查内核(或者:正在进行的证明生成代码)
The Supervisionary proof-checking kernel (or: a work-in-progress towards proof generating code)
摘要:
交互式定理证明软件通常是围绕一个可信的证明检查内核,唯一的系统组件能够验证定理。不可信的自动化过程驻留在内核之外,并通过API驱动它推导新的定理。内核和不受信任的自动化通常是用同一种程序设计语言实现的--“元语言”--通常是ML家族中的某种函数式程序设计语言。这种策略--由米尔纳在他的LCF证明助手中引入--是一种可靠性机制,旨在确保系统产生的任何声称的定理确实被逻辑中的理论所蕴涵。改变策略,操作系统通常也是围绕可信内核设计的,可信内核是一个特权组件,负责协调用户空间软件和硬件之间的交互。不受信任的进程通过跨越硬件特权边界发出内核系统调用来与系统交互。通过这种方式,操作系统内核监督用户空间进程。虽然表面上非常不同,但我们可以看到这两种内核都负责解决相同的任务:面对与不可信代码的无限交互,强制执行系统不变量。然而,解决这个问题的两种解决方案,由各自类型的内核使用,是非常不同的。在这个摘要中,我们探讨设计证明检查内核作为监督软件,内核和不可信的代码之间的分离是由特权,而不是程序设计语言模块边界和类型抽象。我们描述了工作的监督校对内核,并简要概述了其独特的系统接口。然后,我们描述了一些潜在的使用监督内核。
英文摘要:
Interactive theorem proving software is typically designed around a trusted proof-checking kernel, the sole system component capable of authenticating theorems. Untrusted automation procedures reside outside of the kernel, and drive it to deduce new theorems via an API. Kernel and untrusted automation are typically implemented in the same programming language -- the "meta-language" -- usually some functional programming language in the ML family. This strategy -- introduced by Milner in his LCF proof assistant -- is a reliability mechanism, aiming to ensure that any purported theorem produced by the system is indeed entailed by the theory within the logic. Changing tack, operating systems are also typically designed around a trusted kernel, a privileged component responsible for -- amongst other things -- mediating interaction betwixt user-space software and hardware. Untrusted processes interact with the system by issuing kernel system calls across a hardware privilege boundary. In this way, the operating system kernel supervises user-space processes. Though ostensibly very different, squinting, we see that the two kinds of kernel are tasked with solving the same task: enforcing system invariants in the face of unbounded interaction with untrusted code. Yet, the two solutions to solving this problem, employed by the respective kinds of kernel, are very different. In this abstract, we explore designing proof-checking kernels as supervisory software, where separation between kernel and untrusted code is enforced by privilege, not programming language module boundaries and type abstraction. We describe work on the Supervisionary proof-checking kernel, and briefly sketch its unique system interface. We then describe some potential uses of the Supervisionary kernel.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。