无冲突联合决策的最优偏好满足
Optimal preference satisfaction for conflict-free joint decisions
摘要:
当有多种选择时,我们都有偏好。如果我们坚持只满足自己的偏好,我们可能会因为与其他人相同的选择冲突而遭受损失。这种情况适用于由于资源的内在性质而无法将选择划分为多个部分的情况。以往的研究,如顶部交易周期,探讨如何进行公平的联合决策,同时避免决策冲突的博弈论的角度来看,当多个玩家有自己的确定性偏好配置文件。然而,在现实中,概率偏好可以自然地出现在人类的随机决策中。在这里,我们从理论上推导出无冲突的联合决策,可以满足所有个体玩家的概率偏好。更具体地说,我们在数学上证明了条件,其中获得每个选择从个人偏好配置文件,我们称之为损失的结果的偏差的机会,成为零,这意味着所有的球员的满意度是完全赞赏,同时避免决策冲突。此外,即使在零损失无冲突的联合决策是无法实现的情况下,我们展示了如何获得联合决策,实现理论上的最小损失,同时确保无冲突的选择。数值演示也显示了几个基准。
英文摘要:
We all have preferences when multiple choices are available. If we insist on satisfying our preferences only, we may suffer a loss due to conflicts with other people's identical selections. Such a case applies when the choice cannot be divided into multiple pieces due to the intrinsic nature of the resources. Former studies, such as the top trading cycle, examined how to conduct fair joint decision-making while avoiding decision conflicts from the perspective of game theory when multiple players have their own deterministic preference profiles. However, in reality, probabilistic preferences can naturally appear in relation to the stochastic decision-making of humans. Here, we theoretically derive conflict-free joint decision-making that can satisfy the probabilistic preferences of all individual players. More specifically, we mathematically prove the conditions wherein the deviation of the resultant chance of obtaining each choice from the individual preference profile, which we call the loss, becomes zero, meaning that all players' satisfaction is perfectly appreciated while avoiding decision conflicts. Furthermore, even in situations where zero-loss conflict-free joint decision-making is unachievable, we show how to derive joint decision-making that accomplishes the theoretical minimum loss while ensuring conflict-free choices. Numerical demonstrations are also shown with several benchmarks.
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