FieldFuzz:通过网络对专有工业自动化运行时进行原位黑盒模糊测试
FieldFuzz: In Situ Blackbox Fuzzing of Proprietary Industrial Automation Runtimes via the Network
AI总结:
本文提出FieldFuzz框架,通过网络对Codesys运行时进行黑盒模糊测试,结合逆向工程、命令发现和系统内监控,发现了多个漏洞(3个CVE),并在多种ICS设备上验证了其跨平台有效性和对现有技术的显著改进。
摘要:
联网的可编程逻辑控制器(PLC)是用于关键基础设施的专有工业设备,它们在复杂的专有运行时环境中执行控制逻辑应用程序,这些环境提供对PLC中硬件资源的标准化访问。这些控制应用程序使用特定领域的IEC 61131-3语言编程,编译为专有二进制格式,并处理通过工业协议提供的数据。控制应用程序呈现出受篡改流量威胁的攻击面。例如,控制应用程序中的远程代码注入将直接允许接管PLC,威胁到物理过程的损坏和操作人员的安全。然而,由于特定领域的挑战和合适方法的有限可用性,评估控制应用程序的安全性具有挑战性。基于网络的模糊测试通常是测试此类设备的唯一方法,但在没有执行跟踪指导的情况下效率低下。这项工作提出了FieldFuzz框架,用于分析Codesys运行时(被80家工业PLC厂商的400多种设备使用)所带来的安全风险。FieldFuzz利用基于网络的高效模糊测试,主要基于三个贡献:i)通过逆向工程实现对控制应用程序和运行时组件的远程控制,ii)通过网络流量自动发现命令和提取状态码,以及iii)允许系统内跟踪和覆盖率计算的监控设置。我们使用FieldFuzz运行模糊测试活动,发现了多个漏洞,并获得了三个已报告的CVE ID。为了研究FieldFuzz的跨平台适用性,我们在多种工业控制系统(ICS)设备上重现了这些发现,显示出相对于现有技术的显著改进。
英文摘要:
Networked Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are proprietary industrial devices utilized in critical infrastructure that execute control logic applications in complex proprietary runtime environments that provide standardized access to the hardware resources in the PLC. These control applications are programmed in domain-specific IEC 61131-3 languages, compiled into a proprietary binary format, and process data provided via industrial protocols. Control applications present an attack surface threatened by manipulated traffic. For example, remote code injection in a control application would directly allow to take over the PLC, threatening physical process damage and the safety of human operators. However, assessing the security of control applications is challenging due to domain-specific challenges and the limited availability of suitable methods. Network-based fuzzing is often the only way to test such devices but is inefficient without guidance from execution tracing. This work presents the FieldFuzz framework that analyzes the security risks posed by the Codesys runtime (used by over 400 devices from 80 industrial PLC vendors). FieldFuzz leverages efficient network-based fuzzing based on three main contributions: i) reverse-engineering enabled remote control of control applications and runtime components, ii) automated command discovery and status code extraction via network traffic and iii) a monitoring setup to allow on-system tracing and coverage computation. We use FieldFuzz to run fuzzing campaigns, which uncover multiple vulnerabilities, leading to three reported CVE IDs. To study the cross-platform applicability of FieldFuzz, we reproduce the findings on a diverse set of Industrial Control System (ICS) devices, showing a significant improvement over the state-of-the-art.
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