基于Barwise-Seligman信道理论的攻击树验证方法
On Validating Attack Trees with Attack Effects: An Approach from Barwise-Seligman's Channel Theory
摘要:
在安全分析中,攻击树是显示攻击的结构分解和支持攻击的定量属性(称为属性)评估的主要工具。然而,分解的有效性并不是由攻击树本身建立的,当攻击树不准确时,可能会做出错误的安全决策。本文丰富了攻击树的攻击效果,一个正式的系统,专注于细化方案。影响之间的关系表明攻击之间的关系,它允许系统地评估攻击分解。本文应用Barwise-Seligman的通道理论来描述效应。特别是,信息态在连接具有不同粒度的效果方面发挥着重要作用。因此,分解的一致性被正式定义,并陈述了它的条件。该框架被应用到一个车载网络系统的案例研究。作为一致性思想的一个应用,攻击树中攻击的可能缓解程度进行了讨论。
英文摘要:
In security analysis, attack trees are a major tool for showing the structural decomposition of attacks and for supporting the evaluation of the quantitative properties (called attributes) of the attacks. However, the validities of decompositions are not established by attack trees themselves, and fallacious decisions about security may be made when the attack trees are inaccurate. This paper enriches attack trees with effects of attacks, with a formal system focusing on refinement scenarios. Relationships among effects indicate relationships among attacks and it allows for a systematic evaluation of attack decompositions. To describe effects this paper applies Barwise-Seligman's channel theory. Infomorphisms, in particular, play a significant role to connect effects with distinct granularities. As a result, the consistency of a decomposition is formally defined and a condition for it is stated. This framework is applied to a case study of a vehicular network system. As an application of the idea of consistency, possible degrees of mitigation for attacks in attack trees are discussed.
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