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arXiv 2204.06113cs.CR
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六耳密侯:一个生成和评估针对NIDS的灰盒对抗攻击的实用框架

Liuer Mihou: A Practical Framework for Generating and Evaluating Grey-box Adversarial Attacks against NIDS

Ke He, Dan Dongseong Kim, Jing Sun, Jeong Do Yoo, Young Hun Lee, Huy Kang Kim

摘要:

深度学习(DL)由于其高表达性和速度,已成为越来越受欢迎的选择作为基于网络的入侵检测系统(NIDS)的检测算法。不幸的是,DL算法容易受到对抗性示例的攻击,这些示例会对输入进行不可感知的修改,并导致DL算法对输入进行错误分类。现有的NIDS领域的对抗攻击通常直接操纵流量特征,由于流量特征在真实网络中无法重现,因此没有实际意义。产生实用的和规避的对抗攻击仍然是一个研究挑战。本文介绍了Liuer Mihou攻击,该攻击生成实用且可重放的对抗性网络数据包,可以绕过部署在物联网(IoT)网络中的基于异常的NIDS。Liuer Mihou背后的核心思想是利用对抗性可转移性,并在代理NIDS上生成对抗性数据包,该代理NIDS受预定义的变异操作约束,以确保实用性。我们客观地分析了六耳蜜猴对四种基于ML的算法(LOF,OCSVM,RRCF和SOM)和最先进的NIDS,Kitsune的回避。从我们的实验结果中,我们获得了有价值的见解的必要条件对抗异常检测算法的可转移性。超越理论设置,我们在真实的物联网测试平台中重播了对抗攻击,以检验六耳密喉的实用性。此外,我们证明了现有的特征级对抗性防御不能抵御刘尔密侯和建设性地批评特征级对抗性防御的局限性。

英文摘要:

Due to its high expressiveness and speed, Deep Learning (DL) has become an increasingly popular choice as the detection algorithm for Network-based Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSes). Unfortunately, DL algorithms are vulnerable to adversarial examples that inject imperceptible modifications to the input and cause the DL algorithm to misclassify the input. Existing adversarial attacks in the NIDS domain often manipulate the traffic features directly, which hold no practical significance because traffic features cannot be replayed in a real network. It remains a research challenge to generate practical and evasive adversarial attacks. This paper presents the Liuer Mihou attack that generates practical and replayable adversarial network packets that can bypass anomaly-based NIDS deployed in the Internet of Things (IoT) networks. The core idea behind Liuer Mihou is to exploit adversarial transferability and generate adversarial packets on a surrogate NIDS constrained by predefined mutation operations to ensure practicality. We objectively analyse the evasiveness of Liuer Mihou against four ML-based algorithms (LOF, OCSVM, RRCF, and SOM) and the state-of-the-art NIDS, Kitsune. From the results of our experiment, we gain valuable insights into necessary conditions on the adversarial transferability of anomaly detection algorithms. Going beyond a theoretical setting, we replay the adversarial attack in a real IoT testbed to examine the practicality of Liuer Mihou. Furthermore, we demonstrate that existing feature-level adversarial defence cannot defend against Liuer Mihou and constructively criticise the limitations of feature-level adversarial defences.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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