arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2204.04008cs.CRcs.SE
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开源软件供应链攻击分类法

Taxonomy of Attacks on Open-Source Software Supply Chains

Piergiorgio Ladisa, Henrik Plate, Matias Martinez, Olivier Barais

AI总结:

本文提出独立于语言和生态系统的开源软件供应链攻击分类法,以攻击树覆盖107种向量、94起事件和33项防护措施,并经专家与开发者调查验证。

摘要:

对开源软件的广泛依赖使其成为恶意行为者的有利可图目标,反复发生的攻击已经证明了这一点。当今开源供应链的复杂性导致了巨大的攻击面,为攻击者提供了众多机会,以实现向开源制品中注入恶意代码的目标,这些恶意代码随后会被受害者下载并执行。本研究提出了一种面向开源供应链攻击的通用分类法,独立于特定编程语言或生态系统,并覆盖从代码贡献到软件包分发的所有供应链阶段。该分类法采用攻击树形式,涵盖107种独特攻击向量,关联94起真实世界事件,并映射到33项缓解防护措施。研究对17名领域专家和134名软件开发人员开展了用户调查,结果积极验证了该分类法的正确性、全面性、可理解性,以及其对多种用例的适用性。调查参与者还评估了所识别防护措施的效用、成本及其实际使用情况。

英文摘要:

The widespread dependency on open-source software makes it a fruitful target for malicious actors, as demonstrated by recurring attacks. The complexity of today's open-source supply chains results in a significant attack surface, giving attackers numerous opportunities to reach the goal of injecting malicious code into open-source artifacts that is then downloaded and executed by victims. This work proposes a general taxonomy for attacks on open-source supply chains, independent of specific programming languages or ecosystems, and covering all supply chain stages from code contributions to package distribution. Taking the form of an attack tree, it covers 107 unique vectors, linked to 94 real-world incidents, and mapped to 33 mitigating safeguards. User surveys conducted with 17 domain experts and 134 software developers positively validated the correctness, comprehensiveness and comprehensibility of the taxonomy, as well as its suitability for various use-cases. Survey participants also assessed the utility and costs of the identified safeguards, and whether they are used.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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