声誉作为保险：声誉如何缓和公司决定牟取暴利后的公众反弹
Reputation as insurance: how reputation moderates public backlash following a company's decision to profiteer
摘要：
我们研究了一个公司的企业声誉从他们的企业社会责任活动和公司领导人的声誉，一个是无关的，他或她的商业头脑，可以影响经济行动的公平性评估。我们提供的实验证据表明，良好的企业声誉因果缓冲个人的负面公平判断后，公司的决定，以牟取暴利的需求增加。公司的坏名声并不使牟取暴利的决定变得不那么可接受。然而，有证据表明，个人认为一个名声不好的公司提高产品价格以防止损失的决定更不公平。因此，我们的研究结果强调了良好声誉在保护公司免受公众认为不公平的经济决策的严重负面判断方面的重要性。
英文摘要：
We examine whether a company's corporate reputation gained from their CSR activities and a company leader's reputation, one that is unrelated to his or her business acumen, can impact economic action fairness appraisals. We provide experimental evidence that good corporate reputation causally buffers individuals' negative fairness judgment following the firm's decision to profiteer from an increase in the demand. Bad corporate reputation does not make the decision to profiteer as any less acceptable. However, there is evidence that individuals judge as more unfair an ill-reputed firm's decision to raise their product's price to protect against losses. Thus, our results highlight the importance of a good reputation in protecting a firm against severe negative judgments from making an economic decision that the public deems unfair.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
