arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2204.00514eess.SYcs.SY
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具有安全保障的信息物理系统控制综合分析框架

An Analytical Framework for Control Synthesis of Cyber-Physical Systems with Safety Guarantee

Luyao Niu, Abdullah Al Maruf, Andrew Clark, J. Sukarno Mertoguno, Radha Poovendran

摘要:

网络物理系统(CPS)需要在故障和恶意攻击下安全运行。单工架构和最近提出的网络弹性架构,例如,拜占庭容错++(BFT++)分别为CPS在故障和恶意网络攻击下提供安全性。然而,这些现有的架构利用不同的定时参数和实现来提供安全性,并且看起来是不相关的。在本文中,我们提出了一个分析框架来表示单纯形,BFT++和其他实用的网络弹性架构(CRA)。我们构建了一个混杂系统,该系统对采用任何这些架构的CPS进行建模。我们得到充分的条件,通过我们提出的框架下,控制策略是保证安全的。我们提出了一个算法来综合控制策略。我们验证了所提出的框架使用的案例研究的横向控制的波音747,并表明,我们提出的方法,确保系统的安全性。

英文摘要:

Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are required to operate safely under fault and malicious attacks. The simplex architecture and the recently proposed cyber resilient architectures, e.g., Byzantine fault tolerant++ (BFT++), provide safety for CPS under faults and malicious cyber attacks, respectively. However, these existing architectures make use of different timing parameters and implementations to provide safety, and are seemingly unrelated. In this paper, we propose an analytical framework to represent the simplex, BFT++ and other practical cyber resilient architectures (CRAs). We construct a hybrid system that models CPS adopting any of these architectures. We derive sufficient conditions via our proposed framework under which a control policy is guaranteed to be safe. We present an algorithm to synthesize the control policy. We validate the proposed framework using a case study on lateral control of a Boeing 747, and demonstrate that our proposed approach ensures safety of the system.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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