储蓄圈概论
An Algorithmic Introduction to Savings Circles
摘要：
循环储蓄和信贷协会是社区利用正规金融机构机会较少的环境中常见的非正规金融组织。在Rosca中，一组固定的参与者定期向一个底池捐款。然后使用彩票、售后市场或拍卖机制定期分配该底池。Rosca在经济学中有很好的经验研究。然而，由于它们的动态性质，它们在理论上的研究具有挑战性。典型的经济学分析只停留在与其他信贷分配机制进行粗略的有序福利比较，而没有解释roscas的普遍性。在这项工作中，我们采取了算法的角度研究roscas。从无政府无政府代价文献的技术的基础上，我们提出了最坏情况下的福利近似保证。我们进一步实验比较福利的结果作为环境的关键特征不同。这些基本福利分析进一步合理化rosca的流行。最后，我们讨论其他几个有希望的途径。
英文摘要：
Rotating savings and credit associations (roscas) are informal financial organizations common in settings where communities have reduced access to formal financial institutions. In a rosca, a fixed group of participants regularly contribute sums of money to a pot. This pot is then allocated periodically using lottery, aftermarket, or auction mechanisms. Roscas are empirically well-studied in economics. They are, however, challenging to study theoretically due to their dynamic nature. Typical economic analyses of roscas stop at coarse ordinal welfare comparisons to other credit allocation mechanisms, leaving much of roscas' ubiquity unexplained. In this work, we take an algorithmic perspective on the study of roscas. Building on techniques from the price of anarchy literature, we present worst-case welfare approximation guarantees. We further experimentally compare the welfare of outcomes as key features of the environment vary. These cardinal welfare analyses further rationalize the prevalence of roscas. We conclude by discussing several other promising avenues.
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