TPPD:基于目标伪划分的跨核隐蔽信道攻击防御
TPPD: Targeted Pseudo Partitioning based Defence for Cross-Core Covert Channel Attacks
摘要:
现代计算采用高速缓存层次结构来填补处理器和主存之间的速度差距。为了优化系统性能,末级缓存(LLC)在所有内核之间共享。高速缓存共享使它们成为跨核定时通道攻击的一个有吸引力的表面。在这些攻击中,在另一个核心上运行的攻击者可以利用受害者进程的访问时间来渗透秘密信息。这种攻击称为跨核隐蔽信道攻击(CCA)。及时检测并预防跨核CCA对于维护用户的完整性和安全性至关重要,特别是在共享计算环境中。在这项工作中,我们提出了一个有效的跨核心CCA缓解技术。我们提出了一个明智的高速缓存分区的目标集,只为怀疑是攻击者的进程。通过这种方式,对整个LLC的性能影响被最小化,并且良性应用可以充分利用LLC。我们使用了一个周期精确的模拟器(gem 5)来分析所提出的方法的性能和它的安全有效性。它已经成功地消除了跨核隐蔽定时通道攻击,对良性应用程序没有显着的性能影响。与现有的基于分区的解决方案相比,它可以减少23%的缓存未命中,同时需要0.26%的存储开销。
英文摘要:
Contemporary computing employs cache hierarchy to fill the speed gap between processors and main memories. In order to optimise system performance, Last Level Caches(LLC) are shared among all the cores. Cache sharing has made them an attractive surface for cross-core timing channel attacks. In these attacks, an attacker running on another core can exploit the access timing of the victim process to infiltrate the secret information. One such attack is called cross-core Covert Channel Attack (CCA). Timely detection and then prevention of cross-core CCA is critical for maintaining the integrity and security of users, especially in a shared computing environment. In this work, we have proposed an efficient cross-core CCA mitigation technique. We propose a way-wise cache partitioning on targeted sets, only for the processes suspected to be attackers. In this way, the performance impact on the entire LLC is minimised, and benign applications can utilise the LLC to its full capacity. We have used a cycle-accurate simulator (gem5) to analyse the per-formance of the proposed method and its security effectiveness. It has been successful in abolishing the cross-core covert timing channel attack with no significant performance impact on benign applications. It causes 23% less cache misses in comparison to existing partitioning based solutions while requiring 0.26% storage overhead.
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