有偏见的选民模型:一个小团体有多大的说服力?
Biased-voter model: how persuasive a small group can be?
摘要:
我们研究了存在信心和偏见的选民模型动态。我们假设两种类型的选民。无偏见的选民,他们的信心对选民的状态漠不关心,有偏见的选民,他们的信心偏向于一个共同的固定的首选状态。我们研究了这个问题的分析完全图使用平均场论和Erdens-Rényi随机网络拓扑使用对近似,我们假设网络的相互作用拓扑是独立的类型的选民。我们发现,对于一个随机的初始设置的情况下,并为足够大的选民$N$,共识的时间成比例地增加到$\log(N)/γv$,与$γ$有偏见的选民的分数和$v$量化的选民的偏见($v=0$没有偏见)的参数。我们通过数值模拟验证了我们的分析结果。我们研究这个模型的有偏依赖拓扑的网络的相互作用,并检查两个不同的,全球平均度保持策略(模型I和模型II),以获得这种有偏依赖的随机拓扑结构从有偏独立的随机拓扑结构的情况下,作为初始设置。保持所有其它参数恒定,在模型I $μ_{BU}$中,有偏(B)和无偏(U)投票者之间的平均链接数以$μ_{UU}$和$μ_{BB}$为代价而变化,即分别为仅无偏和有偏投票者之间的平均链接数。在模型II中,$μ_{BU}$保持恒定,而$μ_{BB}$以$μ_{UU}$为代价而变化。我们发现,如果代理遵循模型II所描述的策略,他们可以实现一个显着减少的时间达成共识,以及增加的概率达成共识的首选状态。
英文摘要:
We study the voter model dynamics in the presence of confidence and bias. We assume two types of voters. Unbiased voters whose confidence is indifferent to the state of the voter and biased voters whose confidence is biased towards a common fixed preferred state. We study the problem analytically on the complete graph using mean field theory and on an Erdős-Rényi random network topology using the pair approximation, where we assume that the network of interactions topology is independent of the type of voters. We find that for the case of a random initial setup, and for sufficiently large number of voters $N$, the time to consensus increases proportionally to $\log(N)/γv$, with $γ$ the fraction of biased voters and $v$ the parameter quantifying the bias of the voters ($v=0$ no bias). We verify our analytical results through numerical simulations. We study this model on a biased-dependent topology of the network of interactions and examine two distinct, global average-degree preserving strategies (model I and model II) to obtain such biased-dependent random topologies starting from the biased-independent random topology case as the initial setup. Keeping all other parameters constant, in model I, $μ_{BU}$, the average number of links among biased (B) and unbiased (U) voters is varied at the expense of $μ_{UU}$ and $μ_{BB}$, i.e. the average number of links among only unbiased and biased voters respectively. In model II, $μ_{BU}$ is kept constant, while $μ_{BB}$ is varied at the expense of $μ_{UU}$. We find that if the agents follow the strategy described by model II, they can achieve a significant reduction in the time to reach consensus as well as an increment in the probability to reach consensus to the preferred state.
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