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arXiv 2203.04053q-fin.RMq-fin.PM

权益连结保险产品中的风险分担:保险人与再保险人之间的Stackelberg均衡

Risk sharing in equity-linked insurance products: Stackelberg equilibrium between an insurer and a reinsurer

Yevhen Havrylenko, Maria Hinken, Rudi Zagst

AI总结:

该研究针对权益连结保险的最优投资-再保险问题,构建保险人与再保险人为参与方的Stackelberg博弈模型,推导一般效用下的均衡,显式求解幂效用均衡并提出保费折扣选择标准及分析其效用影响。

摘要:

我们研究了权益连结保险产品背景下的最优投资-再保险问题。这类产品通常设有资本担保,这会促使保险人购买再保险。由于再保险合同意味着保险人与再保险人之间存在互动关系,我们将该优化问题建模为一个Stackelberg博弈(主从博弈)。再保险人是博弈中的领导者,通过选择最优投资策略以及其向保险人提供的再保险合同中的安全附加费,来最大化自身的期望效用。再保险人能够评估保险人对自身每一项行动的理性反应。保险公司作为跟随者,通过选择自身的投资策略以及在再保险人给出的价格下购买的再保险额度,来最大化自身的期望效用。在该博弈中,我们推导了适用于一般效用函数的Stackelberg均衡。对于幂效用函数,我们显式计算出了均衡,并发现再保险人会选择最高的再保险保费,使得保险人仍可能购买最大额度的再保险。由于在均衡状态下保险人对再保险额度的选择是无差异的,在实践中,再保险人应考虑收取比均衡保费更低的再保险保费。因此,我们提出了若干选择此类折扣率的标准,并研究了其对双方期望效用的财富等价影响。

英文摘要:

We study the optimal investment-reinsurance problem in the context of equity-linked insurance products. Such products often have a capital guarantee, which can motivate insurers to purchase reinsurance. Since a reinsurance contract implies an interaction between the insurer and the reinsurer, we model the optimization problem as a Stackelberg game. The reinsurer is the leader in the game and maximizes its expected utility by selecting its optimal investment strategy and a safety loading in the reinsurance contract it offers to the insurer. The reinsurer can assess how the insurer will rationally react on each action of the reinsurer. The insurance company is the follower and maximizes its expected utility by choosing its investment strategy and the amount of reinsurance the company purchases at the price offered by the reinsurer. In this game, we derive the Stackelberg equilibrium for general utility functions. For power utility functions, we calculate the equilibrium explicitly and find that the reinsurer selects the largest reinsurance premium such that the insurer may still buy the maximal amount of reinsurance. Since in the equilibrium the insurer is indifferent in the amount of reinsurance, in practice, the reinsurer should consider charging a smaller reinsurance premium than the equilibrium one. Therefore, we propose several criteria for choosing such a discount rate and investigate its wealth-equivalent impact on the expected utility of each party.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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