个性化补贴规则
Personalized Subsidy Rules
摘要:
补贴通常用于鼓励能够带来短期或长期利益的行为。典型的例子包括补贴的职业培训计划和预防性保健产品的规定,其中行为反应和相关的收益可以表现出异质性。本研究采用边际处理效应(MTE)框架,研究基于个体特征的个性化补贴分配。首先,我们推导出福利最大化补贴规则的最优性条件,表明福利可以表示为MTE的函数。接下来,我们表明,补贴通常会导致更好的福利比直接强制鼓励的行为,因为补贴规则隐含的目标个人通过未观察到的异质性的行为反应。当存在正选择时,即当收益较高的个体更倾向于选择被鼓励的行为时,最优补贴规则实现了第一最佳福利,即当决策者能够观察到个体的私人信息时的最优福利。然后,我们提供的方法来(部分)确定最优补贴规则时,MTE被确定和身份不明。特别是,积极的选择允许点识别的最佳补贴规则,即使当MTE曲线不是。作为一个实证应用,我们研究了最优的工资补贴使用的实验数据,从约旦妇女的新机会试点研究。
英文摘要:
Subsidies are commonly used to encourage behaviors that can lead to short- or long-term benefits. Typical examples include subsidized job training programs and provisions of preventive health products, in which both behavioral responses and associated gains can exhibit heterogeneity. This study uses the marginal treatment effect (MTE) framework to study personalized assignments of subsidies based on individual characteristics. First, we derive the optimality condition for a welfare-maximizing subsidy rule by showing that the welfare can be represented as a function of the MTE. Next, we show that subsidies generally result in better welfare than directly mandating the encouraged behavior because subsidy rules implicitly target individuals through unobserved heterogeneity in the behavioral response. When there is positive selection, that is, when individuals with higher returns are more likely to select the encouraged behavior, the optimal subsidy rule achieves the first-best welfare, which is the optimal welfare if a policy-maker can observe individuals' private information. We then provide methods to (partially) identify the optimal subsidy rule when the MTE is identified and unidentified. Particularly, positive selection allows for the point identification of the optimal subsidy rule even when the MTE curve is not. As an empirical application, we study the optimal wage subsidy using the experimental data from the Jordan New Opportunities for Women pilot study.
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