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arXiv 2202.11061cs.GT
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在这种席位分配抽奖机制中,众议院总是赢家

In This Apportionment Lottery, the House Always Wins

Paul Gölz, Dominik Peters, Ariel D. Procaccia

AI总结:

针对随机席位分配方法的选择问题,本文提出基于累积舍入的新方法,同时满足配额性、事前比例性和事后众议院单调性,该舍入技术还可应用于更多领域。

摘要:

席位分配是指按照各州人口比例将h个不可分割的席位分配给各州的问题。在美国众议院的背景下,该问题有着丰富的历史,是数学分析与政治实践相互作用的典型案例。Grimmett(2004)提出采用随机方式分配席位,使得每个州的期望席位数恰好等于其比例份额q_i(事前比例性),且事后获得的席位数为⌊q_i⌋或⌈q_i⌉(配额性)。然而,满足这两条公理的随机席位分配方法存在极大的选择空间,因此我们额外引入了席位分配文献中若干著名的公理。我们的主要研究成果是提出了一种同时满足配额性、事前比例性和众议院单调性的随机方法;众议院单调性是指席位总数变化时可避免悖论的性质,我们要求该性质在事后成立。这一结果基于对二分图上依赖舍入的推广,我们将其称为累积舍入,我们通过席位分配之外的应用案例证明,该方法可能具有独立研究价值。

英文摘要:

Apportionment is the problem of distributing $h$ indivisible seats across states in proportion to the states' populations. In the context of the US House of Representatives, this problem has a rich history and is a prime example of interactions between mathematical analysis and political practice. Grimmett (2004) suggested to apportion seats in a randomized way such that each state receives exactly their proportional share $q_i$ of seats in expectation (ex ante proportionality) and receives either $\lfloor q_i \rfloor$ or $\lceil q_i \rceil$ many seats ex post (quota). However, there is a vast space of randomized apportionment methods satisfying these two axioms, and so we additionally consider prominent axioms from the apportionment literature. Our main result is a randomized method satisfying quota, ex ante proportionality and house monotonicity - a property that prevents paradoxes when the number of seats changes and which we require to hold ex post. This result is based on a generalization of dependent rounding on bipartite graphs, which we call cumulative rounding and which might be of independent interest, as we demonstrate via applications beyond apportionment.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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