早期的排斥导致重复的群体互动中的循环合作
Early exclusion leads to cyclical cooperation in repeated group interactions
摘要：
从进化的角度解释自私个体之间合作的出现和维持仍然是生物学、经济学和社会科学的重大挑战。社会排斥被认为是解决这一难题的一个办法。然而，以往的相关研究往往假设一次性的相互作用，而忽略了如何识别搭便车，这似乎是过于理想化。在这项工作中，我们考虑重复的互动，排斥者需要支付监控成本，以确定免费搭车者的排斥和免费搭车者不能参与以下可能的游戏互动，一旦他们被识别和排除在重复的互动过程中的排斥者。我们发现，这种排斥的引入可以防止在重复的群体互动合作的崩溃。特别是，我们证明了合作者，叛逃者和排斥者之间的进化振荡可以出现在无限大的人口时，实施早期排斥。此外，我们发现，人口花费的大部分时间在合作者占主导地位的早期排除的状态时，随机突变选择被认为是在有限的人口。我们的研究结果强调，早期排除是成功地解决了重复组互动中的合作之谜。
英文摘要：
Explaining the emergence and maintenance of cooperation among selfish individuals from an evolutionary perspective remains a grand challenge in biology, economy, and social sciences. Social exclusion is believed to be an answer to this conundrum. However, previously related studies often assume one-shot interactions and ignore how free-riding is identified, which seem to be too idealistic. In this work, we consider repeated interactions where excluders need to pay a monitoring cost to identify free-riders for exclusion and free-riders cannot participate in the following possible game interactions once they are identified and excluded by excluders in the repeated interaction process. We reveal that the introduction of such exclusion can prevent the breakdown of cooperation in repeated group interactions. In particular, we demonstrate that an evolutionary oscillation among cooperators, defectors, and excluders can appear in infinitely large populations when early exclusion is implemented. In addition, we find that the population spends most of the time in states where cooperators dominate for early exclusion when stochastic mutation-selection is considered in finite populations. Our results highlight that early exclusion is successful in solving the mentioned enigma of cooperation in repeated group interactions.
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