FairTraDEX：一种防止价值提取的去中心化交易所
FairTraDEX: A Decentralised Exchange Preventing Value Extraction
摘要：
我们提出了FairTraDEX，一个基于频繁批量拍卖（FBAs）的去中心化交易（DEX）协议，该协议提供了针对可提取价值的正式博弈论保证。当由可信的第三方运行时，FBA提供独特的博弈论最优策略，确保玩家获得的价格等于流动性提供者的公平价格，不包括明确的预定费用。FairTraDEX复制了FBA的关键功能，这些功能使用零知识协议中的集合成员资格和托管强制提交-揭示协议的组合提供这些博弈论保证。我们扩展的结果FBAs处理垄断和/或恶意的流动性提供商。我们提供了真实世界的例子，证明了在现有的学术和行业标准协议中执行订单的成本变得令人望而却步，因为订单大小的增加，由于基本的值提取技术，推广为最大可提取值。我们进一步证明了FairTraDEX可以防止这些执行成本，保证独立于订单大小的固定费用模型，这是DEX协议的第一个保证。我们还提供了FairTraDEX的详细Solidity和伪代码实现，使FairTraDEX成为一个新颖而实用的贡献。
英文摘要：
We present FairTraDEX, a decentralized exchange (DEX) protocol based on frequent batch auctions (FBAs), which provides formal game-theoretic guarantees against extractable value. FBAs when run by a trusted third-party provide unique game-theoretic optimal strategies which ensure players are shown prices equal to the liquidity provider's fair price, excluding explicit, pre-determined fees. FairTraDEX replicates the key features of an FBA that provide these game-theoretic guarantees using a combination of set-membership in zero-knowledge protocols and an escrow-enforced commit-reveal protocol. We extend the results of FBAs to handle monopolistic and/or malicious liquidity providers. We provide real-world examples that demonstrate that the costs of executing orders in existing academic and industry-standard protocols become prohibitive as order size increases due to basic value extraction techniques, popularized as maximal extractable value. We further demonstrate that FairTraDEX protects against these execution costs, guaranteeing a fixed fee model independent of order size, the first guarantee of it's kind for a DEX protocol. We also provide detailed Solidity and pseudo-code implementations of FairTraDEX, making FairTraDEX a novel and practical contribution.
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