购买意见
Buying Opinions
AI总结:
研究委托人如何通过契约激励代理人获取并诚实报告软信息,证明在风险中性等条件下可实现第一最优结果,并刻画了次优契约。
摘要:
委托人雇佣代理人以获取关于未知状态的软信息。尽管代理人如何学习以及代理人发现什么都不可契约化,我们表明,委托人对于能够诱导代理人获取并诚实报告的信息是不受限制的。当代理人是风险中性的,并且a)未被要求学习太多,b)能够以足够低的成本获取信息,或c)能够面临足够大的惩罚时,委托人可以实现第一最优结果。我们讨论了风险厌恶(代理人方面)的影响,并刻画了次优契约。
英文摘要:
A principal hires an agent to acquire soft information about an unknown state. Even though neither how the agent learns nor what the agent discovers are contractible, we show the principal is unconstrained as to what information the agent can be induced to acquire and report honestly. When the agent is risk neutral, and a) is not asked to learn too much, b) can acquire information sufficiently cheaply, or c) can face sufficiently large penalties, the principal can attain the first-best outcome. We discuss the effect of risk aversion (on the part of the agent) and characterize the second-best contracts.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。