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arXiv 2202.04518cs.CRcs.LO
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断言的不安全问题仍然存在于NP中

Insecurity problem for assertions remains in NP

R. Ramanujam, Vaishnavi Sundararajan, S. P. Suresh

摘要:

在密码协议的符号验证中,一个核心问题是判定协议是否允许将指定秘密泄露给恶意入侵者的执行。Rusinowitch和Turuani(2003)表明,当考虑到许多会话和一个只传递术语的协议模型时,这个“不安全问题”是NP完全的。他们的证明策略的核心是观察到任何协议的执行都可以被入侵者只传达有限大小的条款的协议模拟。然而,当我们考虑模型时,除了术语之外,还可以传达逻辑公式,不安全问题的分析变得棘手。在本文中,我们考虑协议的不安全性问题的逻辑语句,包括平等的条款和存在量化。存在量词的见证人可能是无限大的,并且在保持相等证明的同时获得小的见证人使分析复杂化。我们使用了一个“类型化”的等式证明的概念,并从[RT03]扩展技术来证明这个问题也是NP问题。我们还表明,这些技术可以用于分析系统的不安全问题,例如Ramanujam,Sundararajan和Suresh(2017)提出的问题。

英文摘要:

In the symbolic verification of cryptographic protocols, a central problem is deciding whether a protocol admits an execution which leaks a designated secret to the malicious intruder. Rusinowitch and Turuani (2003) show that, when considering finitely many sessions and a protocol model where only terms are communicated, this ``insecurity problem'' is NP-complete. Central to their proof strategy is the observation that any execution of a protocol can be simulated by one where the intruder only communicates terms of bounded size. However, when we consider models where, in addition to terms, one can also communicate logical formulas, the analysis of the insecurity problem becomes tricky. In this paper we consider the insecurity problem for protocols with logical statements that include equality on terms and existential quantification. Witnesses for existential quantifiers may be of unbounded size, and obtaining small witnesses while maintaining equality proofs complicates the analysis. We use a notion of "typed" equality proofs, and extend techniques from [RT03] to show that this problem is also in NP. We also show that these techniques can be used to analyze the insecurity problem for systems such as the one proposed in Ramanujam, Sundararajan and Suresh (2017).

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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