基于本体的攻击图扩充
Ontology-based Attack Graph Enrichment
摘要:
攻击图提供了攻击者可能实施的攻击系统的可能操作的表示。网络安全专家使用它们来做出决策,例如,决定补救和恢复计划。可以使用不同的方法来构建这样的图。我们专注于基于谓词逻辑的逻辑攻击图,以定义敌对行为的因果关系。由于网络和漏洞不断变化(例如,新的应用程序被安装在系统设备上,更新的服务被公开展示等),我们提出用谓词的语义增强后处理来丰富攻击图生成方法。图表现在映射到确认成功攻击操作的监控警报,并根据网络和漏洞变化进行更新。因此,谓词得到定期更新,基于攻击证据和本体充实。这允许验证更改是否会导致攻击者达到初始目标或对系统造成初始图中未预期的进一步损害。我们在影响智慧城市的网络物理安全的特定领域下说明了这种方法。我们使用现有的工具和本体验证的方法。
英文摘要:
Attack graphs provide a representation of possible actions that adversaries can perpetrate to attack a system. They are used by cybersecurity experts to make decisions, e.g., to decide remediation and recovery plans. Different approaches can be used to build such graphs. We focus on logical attack graphs, based on predicate logic, to define the causality of adversarial actions. Since networks and vulnerabilities are constantly changing (e.g., new applications get installed on system devices, updated services get publicly exposed, etc.), we propose to enrich the attack graph generation approach with a semantic augmentation post-processing of the predicates. Graphs are now mapped to monitoring alerts confirming successful attack actions and updated according to network and vulnerability changes. As a result, predicates get periodically updated, based on attack evidences and ontology enrichment. This allows to verify whether changes lead the attacker to the initial goals or to cause further damage to the system not anticipated in the initial graphs. We illustrate the approach under the specific domain of cyber-physical security affecting smart cities. We validate the approach using existing tools and ontologies.
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