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arXiv 2202.00664math.OC
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传感器攻击下非线性系统的控制器机密性

Controller confidentiality for nonlinear systems under sensor attacks

Michelle S. Chong

摘要:

传感器攻击下的控制器机密性是指当对手知道对象和控制器的模型时,控制器的内部状态是否可以被估计,而只能访问传感器,而不能访问执行器。当非线性闭环系统是可检测的时,我们证明了控制器的状态可以被精确估计。在没有可检测性的情况下,控制器的机密性仍然可以通过一个强大的可观测性假设下的传感器,这使得控制器的状态被估计与任意的精度在探测期间,并在非探测期间的有界误差的周期性探测计划被突破。此外,可以通过选择适当的探测持续时间来保持隐身。研究表明,通过平衡估计精度和敌手的隐蔽性,可以突破非线性系统的控制器机密性。

英文摘要:

Controller confidentiality under sensor attacks refers to whether the internal states of the controller can be estimated when the adversary knows the model of the plant and controller, while only having access to sensors, but not the actuators. We show that the controller's state can be estimated accurately when the nonlinear closed-loop system is detectable. In the absence of detectability, controller confidentiality can still be breached with a periodic probing scheme via the sensors under a robust observability assumption, which allows for the controller's state to be estimated with arbitrary accuracy during the probing period, and with bounded error during the non-probing period. Further, stealth can be maintained by choosing an appropriate probing duration. This study shows that the controller confidentiality for nonlinear systems can be breached by balancing the estimation precision and the stealthiness of the adversary.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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