In feature-based dynamic pricing, a seller sets appropriate prices for a sequence of products (described by feature vectors) on the fly by learning from the binary outcomes of previous sales sessions ("Sold" if valuation $\geq$ price, and "Not Sold" otherwise). Existing works either assume noiseless linear valuation or precisely-known noise distribution, which limits the applicability of those algorithms in practice when these assumptions are hard to verify. In this work, we study two more agnostic models: (a) a "linear policy" problem where we aim at competing with the best linear pricing policy while making no assumptions on the data, and (b) a "linear noisy valuation" problem where the random valuation is linear plus an unknown and assumption-free noise. For the former model, we show a $\tildeΘ(d^{\frac13}T^{\frac23})$ minimax regret up to logarithmic factors. For the latter model, we present an algorithm that achieves an $\tilde{O}(T^{\frac34})$ regret, and improve the best-known lower bound from $Ω(T^{\frac35})$ to $\tildeΩ(T^{\frac23})$. These results demonstrate that no-regret learning is possible for feature-based dynamic pricing under weak assumptions, but also reveal a disappointing fact that the seemingly richer pricing feedback is not significantly more useful than the bandit-feedback in regret reduction.
Motivated by the application of real-time pricing in e-commerce platforms, we consider the problem of revenue-maximization in a setting where the seller can leverage contextual information describing the customer's history and the product's type to predict her valuation of the product. However, her true valuation is unobservable to the seller, only binary outcome in the form of success-failure of a transaction is observed. Unlike in usual contextual bandit settings, the optimal price/arm given a covariate in our setting is sensitive to the detailed characteristics of the residual uncertainty d…
Minimax Optimality in Contextual Dynamic Pricing with General Valuation Models
School of Management, Xiamen University（厦门大学管理学院）；Department of Industrial Engineering and Decision Analytics, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology（香港科技大学工业工程与决策分析系）
We discuss a data market technique based on intrinsic (relevance and uniqueness) as well as extrinsic value (influenced by supply and demand) of data. For intrinsic value, we explain how to perform valuation of data in absolute terms (i.e just by itself), or relatively (i.e in comparison to multiple datasets) or in conditional terms (i.e valuating new data given currently existing data).
We study revenue optimization learning algorithms for repeated second-price auctions with reserve where a seller interacts with multiple strategic bidders each of which holds a fixed private valuation for a good and seeks to maximize his expected future cumulative discounted surplus. We propose a novel algorithm that has strategic regret upper bound of $O(\log\log T)$ for worst-case valuations. This pricing is based on our novel transformation that upgrades an algorithm designed for the setup with a single buyer to the multi-buyer case. We provide theoretical guarantees on the ability of a tra…
Darden School of Business, University of Virginia（弗吉尼亚大学达顿商学院）
We study an off-policy contextual pricing problem where the seller has access to samples of prices that customers were previously offered, whether they purchased at that price, and auxiliary features describing the customer and/or item being sold. This is in contrast to the well-studied setting in which samples of the customer's valuation (willingness to pay) are observed. In our setting, the observed data is influenced by the previous pricing policy, and we do not know how customers would have responded to alternative prices. We introduce suitable loss functions for this setting that can be d…
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill（北卡罗来纳大学教堂山分校）；Purdue University（普渡大学）
Contextual dynamic pricing aims to set personalized prices based on sequential interactions with customers. At each time period, a customer who is interested in purchasing a product comes to the platform. The customer's valuation for the product is a linear function of contexts, including product and customer features, plus some random market noise. The seller does not observe the customer's true valuation, but instead needs to learn the valuation by leveraging contextual information and historical binary purchase feedbacks. Existing models typically assume full or partial knowledge of the ran…
University of Virginia（弗吉尼亚大学）；IBM Research（IBM研究院）
Data-driven pricing strategies are becoming increasingly common, where customers are offered a personalized price based on features that are predictive of their valuation of a product. It is desirable for this pricing policy to be simple and interpretable, so it can be verified, checked for fairness, and easily implemented. However, efforts to incorporate machine learning into a pricing framework often lead to complex pricing policies which are not interpretable, resulting in slow adoption in practice. We present a customized, prescriptive tree-based algorithm that distills knowledge from a co…
TimeLAVA: Learning-Agnostic Valuation for Time Series Data
School of Mathematics and Statistics, The University of Melbourne（墨尔本大学数学与统计学学院）；Statistics, The University of Melbourne（墨尔本大学统计学系）；Statistics, University of Sydney（悉尼大学统计学系）；Responsible AI Research Centre, Australian Institute for Machine Learning（澳大利亚机器学习研究所负责任人工智能研究中心）；Amazon（亚马逊）；School of Mathematical Sciences, Adelaide University（阿德莱德大学数学科学学院）；Department of Machine Learning, MBZUAI（MBZUAI机器学习系）
Università degli Studi di Milano（米兰大学）；ENS Paris-Saclay（巴黎萨克雷高等师范学院）；CNRS（法国国家科学研究中心）；Criteo AI Lab（Criteo人工智能实验室）
Motivated by posted price auctions where buyers are grouped in an unknown number of latent types characterized by their private values for the good on sale, we investigate revenue maximization in stochastic dynamic pricing when the distribution of buyers' private values is supported on an unknown set of points in [0,1] of unknown cardinality $K$. This setting can be viewed as an instance of a stochastic $K$-armed bandit problem where the location of the arms (the $K$ unknown valuations) must be learned as well. In the distribution-free case, we prove that our setting is just as hard as $K$-arm…
Darden School of Business, University of Virginia（弗吉尼亚大学达顿商学院）；University of Texas at Austin（得克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校）；IBM Watson（IBM沃森）
We study a pricing setting where each customer is offered a contextualized price based on customer and/or product features. Often only historical sales data are available, so we observe whether a customer purchased a product at the price prescribed rather than the customer's true valuation. Such observational data are influenced by historical pricing policies, which introduce difficulties in evaluating the effectiveness of future policies. The goal of this paper is to formulate loss functions that can be used for evaluating pricing policies directly from observational data, rather than going t…
We study valuing the data of a data owner/seller for a data seeker/buyer. Data valuation is often carried out for a specific task assuming a particular utility metric, such as test accuracy on a validation set, that may not exist in practice. In this work, we focus on task-agnostic data valuation without any validation requirements. The data buyer has access to a limited amount of data (which could be publicly available) and seeks more data samples from a data seller. We formulate the problem as estimating the differences in the statistical properties of the data at the seller with respect to …
University of Pennsylvania（宾夕法尼亚大学）；Microsoft Research（微软研究院）；Northeastern University（东北大学）
We study the problem of a seller dynamically pricing $d$ distinct types of indivisible goods, when faced with the online arrival of unit-demand buyers drawn independently from an unknown distribution. The goods are not in limited supply, but can only be produced at a limited rate and are costly to produce. The seller observes only the bundle of goods purchased at each day, but nothing else about the buyer's valuation function. Our main result is a dynamic pricing algorithm for optimizing welfare (including the seller's cost of production) that runs in time and a number of rounds that are polyn…
From Stream to Pool: Pricing Under the Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility
Joseph M. Katz Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh（匹兹堡大学约瑟夫·M·卡茨商学院）；Center of Data Science for Enterprise and Society (CDSES), Cornell University（康奈尔大学企业与社会数据科学中心）；Naveen Jindal School of Management, UT Dallas（德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校纳文·金达尔管理学院）
Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology（麻省理工学院斯隆管理学院）；University of Southern California（南加州大学）；Google Research（谷歌研究院）
Motivated by pricing in ad exchange markets, we consider the problem of robust learning of reserve prices against strategic buyers in repeated contextual second-price auctions. Buyers' valuations for an item depend on the context that describes the item. However, the seller is not aware of the relationship between the context and buyers' valuations, i.e., buyers' preferences. The seller's goal is to design a learning policy to set reserve prices via observing the past sales data, and her objective is to minimize her regret for revenue, where the regret is computed against a clairvoyant policy …
Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr. School of Business, Purdue University（普渡大学米切尔·E·丹尼尔斯 Jr.商学院）；Department of Statistics and Data Science, Yale University（耶鲁大学统计与数据科学系）；Department of Industrial Engineering and Management Sciences, Northwestern University（西北大学工业工程与管理科学系）
Massachusetts Institute of Technology（麻省理工学院）；Google Research（谷歌研究院）
In the contextual pricing problem a seller repeatedly obtains products described by an adversarially chosen feature vector in $\mathbb{R}^d$ and only observes the purchasing decisions of a buyer with a fixed but unknown linear valuation over the products. The regret measures the difference between the revenue the seller could have obtained knowing the buyer valuation and what can be obtained by the learning algorithm. We give a poly-time algorithm for contextual pricing with $O(d \log \log T + d \log d)$ regret which matches the $Ω(d \log \log T)$ lower bound up to the $d \log d$ additive fact…
