冲突和领导力的模型：政治中有鹰派倾向吗？
A model of conflict and leadership: Is there a hawkish drift in politics?
摘要：
我们分析了公民和叛乱集团之间的冲突，如土地的固定资源。公民有一个选举产生的领导人，他提出了一个分裂，这样，割让给叛乱分子的土地越少，冲突的代价就越高。领导者的能力和意识形态不同，领导者的能力越高，冲突的成本越低，领导者越强硬，他从保留土地的效用越高。我们表明，冲突产生于政治进程与连任的动机，导致领导人选择放弃太少的土地，以信号他们的能力。我们还表明，当办公室租金高，政治均衡和第二个最好的分歧，特别是，在政治均衡下的政策是更鹰派相比，第二个最好的。当意识形态和能力都是未知的，我们提供了一个合理的条件下，连任的概率增加的领导人的鹰派，从而提供了一个解释，为什么鹰派政治家可能有一个天然的优势，在选举过程中。
英文摘要：
We analyze conflict between a citizenry and an insurgent group over a fixed resource such as land. The citizenry has an elected leader who proposes a division such that, the lower the land ceded to the insurgents, the higher the cost of conflict. Leaders differ in ability and ideology such that the higher the leader's ability, the lower the cost of conflict, and the more hawkish the leader, the higher his utility from retaining land. We show that the conflict arises from the political process with re-election motives causing leaders to choose to cede too little land to signal their ability. We also show that when the rents of office are high, the political equilibrium and the second best diverge; in particular, the policy under the political equilibrium is more hawkish compared to the second best. When both ideology and ability are unknown, we provide a plausible condition under which the probability of re-election increases in the leader's hawkishness, thereby providing an explanation for why hawkish politicians may have a natural advantage under the electoral process.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
