以告密制告密：合作、沟通，以及二者如何相互稳定
Tit for Tattling: Cooperation, communication, and how each could stabilize the other
AI总结：
本文研究间接互惠中声誉沟通系统如何在无外生压力下保持演化稳定，提出对齐规范、第三方真实性信号和偶尔犯错三个条件，以同时维持沟通真实性与合作普遍性。
摘要：
间接互惠是一种机制，个体通过它与那些曾与他人合作的人进行合作。这创造了一种体制，在该体制中，重复互动不再是激励合作的必要条件（而直接互惠则要求重复互动）。然而，间接互惠带来了一个新问题：行动者如何知道谁曾与他人合作？为了知晓这一点，行动者需要获取某种形式的声誉信息。也许存在一个传播声誉信息的沟通系统，但它如何保持真实且具有信息量？大多数论文假设存在一个真实、主动且具有信息量的沟通系统；在本文中，我们试图解释在没有外生压力的情况下，这样一个沟通系统如何能够在演化上保持稳定。具体而言，我们提出三个条件，它们共同维持沟通系统的真实性和合作的普遍性：个体（1）使用一种规范，该规范奖励它所规定的行为（一种对齐规范），（2）不仅能够就其他行动者的行为发出信号，还能就他们的真实性发出信号（通过充当互动的第三方观察者），以及（3）偶尔犯错，展示了错误如何通过引入多样性来创造稳定性。
英文摘要：
Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism by which individuals cooperate with those who have cooperated with others. This creates a regime in which repeated interactions are not necessary to incent cooperation (as would be required for direct reciprocity). However, indirect reciprocity creates a new problem: how do agents know who has cooperated with others? To know this, agents would need to access some form of reputation information. Perhaps there is a communication system to disseminate reputation information, but how does it remain truthful and informative? Most papers assume the existence of a truthful, forthcoming, and informative communication system; in this paper, we seek to explain how such a communication system could remain evolutionarily stable in the absence of exogenous pressures. Specifically, we present three conditions that together maintain both the truthfulness of the communication system and the prevalence of cooperation: individuals (1) use a norm that rewards the behaviors that it prescribes (an aligned norm), (2) can signal not only about the actions of other agents, but also about their truthfulness (by acting as third party observers to an interaction), and (3) make occasional mistakes, demonstrating how error can create stability by introducing diversity.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
