将裁决外包给战略陪审员
Outsourcing Adjudication to Strategic Jurors
摘要：
我们研究一个场景，其中裁定任务（例如，二元纠纷的解决）外包给一组被任命为陪审员的代理人。这种情况在Web 3环境中尤其重要，因为在Web 3环境中，不可能核实裁决结果，而且原则上，指定的代理人对最终裁决漠不关心。我们考虑简单的裁决机制，使用（1）多数投票决定最终的裁决和（2）支付功能，以奖励与多数投票的代理人，并可能惩罚少数。代理人与这样一种机制进行战略互动：他们努力了解如何正确判断争议，并根据这种理解和他们对其余投票的信息投赞成/反对票。最终，他们投票，使他们的效用（即，他们从该机制得到的报酬减去他们的努力所产生的费用）得到最大化。在合理的假设下，代理人的努力是如何与她的理解的争议，我们表明，适当的支付功能可以用来恢复正确的判决结果的概率很高。我们的研究结果来自于对诱导策略博弈的详细分析，并利用了理论论证和模拟实验。
英文摘要：
We study a scenario where an adjudication task (e.g., the resolution of a binary dispute) is outsourced to a set of agents who are appointed as jurors. This scenario is particularly relevant in a Web3 environment, where no verification of the adjudication outcome is possible, and the appointed agents are, in principle, indifferent to the final verdict. We consider simple adjudication mechanisms that use (1) majority voting to decide the final verdict and (2) a payment function to reward the agents with the majority vote and possibly punish the ones in the minority. Agents interact with such a mechanism strategically: they exert some effort to understand how to properly judge the dispute and cast a yes/no vote that depends on this understanding and on information they have about the rest of the votes. Eventually, they vote so that their utility (i.e., their payment from the mechanism minus the cost due to their effort) is maximized. Under reasonable assumptions about how an agent's effort is related to her understanding of the dispute, we show that appropriate payment functions can be used to recover the correct adjudication outcome with high probability. Our findings follow from a detailed analysis of the induced strategic game and make use of both theoretical arguments and simulation experiments.
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