变化环境中的静态社会学习
Stationary social learning in a changing environment
摘要:
我们认为社会学习在一个不断变化的世界。只有当代理人定期根据新信息采取行动时,社会才能对状态变化做出反应,这限制了社会学习的价值。当状态接近持续时,大多数代理人选择相同行动的共识通常会出现。然而,由于社会在状态变化后表现出惯性,共识行动与状态并不完全相关。当信号更精确时,惯性阶段可能会更长,即使代理人提取了大量过去行为的样本,因为行为在样本中变得过于相关,从而降低了信息量和福利。
英文摘要:
We consider social learning in a changing world. Society can remain responsive to state changes only if agents regularly act upon fresh information, which limits the value of social learning. When the state is close to persistent, a consensus whereby most agents choose the same action typically emerges. The consensus action is not perfectly correlated with the state though, because the society exhibits inertia following state changes. Phases of inertia may be longer when signals are more precise, even if agents draw large samples of past actions, as actions then become too correlated within samples, thereby reducing informativeness and welfare.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。