Posetal Games:有优先权的博弈中均衡的有效性、存在性和细化
Posetal Games: Efficiency, Existence, and Refinement of Equilibria in Games with Prioritized Metrics
摘要:
现代应用要求机器人遵守多个通常相互冲突的规则并与其他代理进行交互。我们提出Posetal游戏作为一类游戏,其中每个玩家通过一组部分有序的指标表达对结果的偏好。这允许将每个玩家的层次优先级与环境的交互性质相结合。通过将标准博弈论的概念结合起来,我们给出了两个关于局中人偏好的充分条件,证明了有限行动集上纯纳什均衡的存在性。此外,我们定义正式的偏好结构上的操作,并将它们链接到一个完善的游戏解决方案,显示如何设置的均衡可以系统地缩小。所呈现的结果在驾驶游戏中展示,其中自动驾驶车辆从有限的一组轨迹中进行选择。结果表明,结果的可解释性方面的最小排名违反每个球员。
英文摘要:
Modern applications require robots to comply with multiple, often conflicting rules and to interact with the other agents. We present Posetal Games as a class of games in which each player expresses a preference over the outcomes via a partially ordered set of metrics. This allows one to combine hierarchical priorities of each player with the interactive nature of the environment. By contextualizing standard game theoretical notions, we provide two sufficient conditions on the preference of the players to prove existence of pure Nash Equilibria in finite action sets. Moreover, we define formal operations on the preference structures and link them to a refinement of the game solutions, showing how the set of equilibria can be systematically shrunk. The presented results are showcased in a driving game where autonomous vehicles select from a finite set of trajectories. The results demonstrate the interpretability of results in terms of minimum-rank-violation for each player.
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