在结构化人口中的雇佣军惩罚
Mercenary punishment in structured populations
摘要：
惩罚那些拒绝参与共同努力的人是一种众所周知的、经过深入研究的方法，可以保持自利行为体之间的合作。但这种行为代价高昂，因此，通常也参与原始合资企业的惩罚者变得脆弱，这危及这种激励的有效性。作为替代方案，我们可以雇佣特殊的玩家，他们唯一的职责就是监视人口并惩罚叛逃者。这种类似于警察或雇佣兵的惩罚可以由一个税收基金来维持，如果这种税收可以忽略不计，那么在不同的战略之间就可能出现一种循环的优势。当这种税是相关的，那么这个解决方案就消失了。在后一种情况下，罚款水平成为一个重要因素，决定了惩罚者是与合作者共存，还是与背叛者共存。最大的平均结果可以达到一个中间的惩罚成本值。我们的观察结果强调，我们应该特别小心，当这种惩罚和伴随的税收是为了达到一个集体目标。
英文摘要：
Punishing those who refuse to participate in common efforts is a known and intensively studied way to maintain cooperation among self-interested agents. But this act is costly, hence punishers who are generally also engaged in the original joint venture, become vulnerable, which jeopardizes the effectiveness of this incentive. As an alternative, we may hire special players, whose only duty is to watch the population and punish defectors. Such a policelike or mercenary punishment can be maintained by a tax-based fund. If this tax is negligible, a cyclic dominance may emerge among different strategies. When this tax is relevant then this solution disappears. In the latter case, the fine level becomes a significant factor that determines whether punisher players coexist with cooperators or alternatively with defectors. The maximal average outcome can be reached at an intermediate cost value of punishment. Our observations highlight that we should take special care when such kind of punishment and accompanying tax are introduced to reach a collective goal.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
