错误类型的信息
The Wrong Kind of Information
AI总结:
本文研究代理人基于可验证与不可验证信息决策时,法院审查与惩罚机制下的效率权衡,发现改进不可验证信息提升效率,而改进可验证信息可能降低效率。
摘要:
一些带有偏见的代理人,根据关于项目效率的信息,决定是否承担一个风险项目或选择安全替代方案。这些信息中只有一部分是可验证的。无偏见的代理人只想承担高效项目,而有偏见的代理人则想承担任何项目。如果项目造成损害,法院会审查可验证信息,形成对代理人类型的判断,并决定惩罚。在威慑低效项目与对使用不可验证信息产生寒蝉效应之间存在张力。改进不可验证信息总能提高整体效率,但改进可验证信息可能降低效率。
英文摘要:
Agents, some with a bias, decide between undertaking a risky project and a safe alternative based on information about the project's efficiency. Only a part of that information is verifiable. Unbiased agents want to undertake only efficient projects, while biased agents want to undertake any project. If the project causes harm, a court examines the verifiable information, forms a belief about the agent's type, and decides the punishment. Tension arises between deterring inefficient projects and a chilling effect on using the unverifiable information. Improving the unverifiable information always increases overall efficiency, but improving the verifiable information may reduce efficiency.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。