可退还收入年金：退款保证的可行性
Refundable income annuities: Feasibility of money-back guarantees
摘要：
可退还的收入年金（IA），如现金退款和分期退款，在物质上不同于经济学家所钟爱的终身年金。除了终身收入，他们保证年金领取人或受益人将收到他们的钱回来，尽管随着时间的推移缓慢。我们的文件显示，可退款的IA现在代表了美国的大部分销售额，然而，保险和养老金经济学家大多忽视了这一点。而且，虽然他们的定价，持续时间和货币的价值比是复杂的递归性，将解释，我们提供了一个前进的道路，使可退还的IA易于处理。一个关键的结果涉及的市场价格的现金退款IA，当精算现值毛了保险负荷。我们证明了价格不再是年龄的下降函数，年龄较大的买家可能会比年轻人支付更多。此外，存在一个阈值估值率，低于该值，任何价格都不可行。这也可以解释为什么经通货膨胀调整的投资协定几乎消失了。
英文摘要：
Refundable income annuities (IA), such as cash-refund and instalment-refund, differ in material ways from the life-only version beloved by economists. In addition to lifetime income they guarantee the annuitant or beneficiary will receive their money back albeit slowly over time. We document that refundable IAs now represent the majority of sales in the U.S., yet they are mostly ignored by insurance and pension economists. And, although their pricing, duration, and money's-worth-ratio is complicated by recursivity which will be explained, we offer a path forward to make refundable IAs tractable. A key result concerns the market price of cash-refund IAs, when the actuarial present value is grossed-up by an insurance loading. We prove that price is counterintuitively no longer a declining function of age and older buyers might pay more than younger ones. Moreover, there exists a threshold valuation rate below which no price is viable. This may also explain why inflation-adjusted IAs have all but disappeared.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
