arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2110.09557cs.CR
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用于减少攻击面的动态代码激活

On-the-fly Code Activation for Attack Surface Reduction

Chris Porter, Sharjeel Khan, Santosh Pande

摘要:

现代代码重用攻击充分利用了臃肿的软件。攻击者将原本无害的代码中的短指令序列拼凑在一起,以执行恶意操作。消除这些可重用的代码片段(称为小工具)已成为减少攻击面的主要关注点之一。其目的是打破这些小工具链,从而使这种代码重用攻击不可能或不太常见。先前关于攻击面减少的工作通常试图通过对应用程序进行子集化来消除此类攻击,例如,通过用户指定的输入、配置或功能,或者通过关注第三方库来实现对应用程序干扰最小的高小工具减少。在这项工作中,我们提出了一个通用的,整个程序的攻击面减少技术称为OCA,显着减少小工具,并有轻微的性能下降。OCA不需要用户输入,并保持所有功能不变。OCA识别特定的程序点,并通过分析确定在运行时启用/禁用的关键功能集。因此,运行时系统在执行期间控制启用的函数的集合,从而显著减少攻击者可以使用的活动小工具的集合,并且通过扩展,显著地减少活动小工具链的集合。在SPEC CPU 2017上,我们的框架实现了73.2%的小工具减少,平均速度仅为4%。在10个GNU coreutils应用程序上,它实现了87.2%的减少。在nginx服务器上,它实现了80.3%的减少和2%的减速。我们还提供了一个小工具链打破所有应用程序的研究,并表明,我们的框架打破了壳产卵链在所有情况下。

英文摘要:

Modern code reuse attacks are taking full advantage of bloated software. Attackers piece together short sequences of instructions in otherwise benign code to carry out malicious actions. Eliminating these reusable code snippets, known as gadgets, has become one of the prime concerns of attack surface reduction. The aim is to break these chains of gadgets, thereby making such code reuse attacks impossible or substantially less common. Previous work on attack surface reduction has typically tried to eliminate such attacks by subsetting the application, e.g. via user-specified inputs, configurations, or features, or by focusing on third-party libraries to achieve high gadget reductions with minimal interference to the application. In this work we present a general, whole-program attack surface reduction technique called OCA that significantly reduces gadgets and has minor performance degradation. OCA requires no user inputs and leaves all features intact. OCA identifies specific program points and through analysis determines key function sets to enable/disable at runtime. The runtime system, thus, controls the set of enabled functions during execution, thereby significantly reducing the set of active gadgets an attacker can use, and by extension, cutting down the set of active gadget chains dramatically. On SPEC CPU 2017, our framework achieves 73.2% total gadget reduction with only 4% average slowdown. On 10 GNU coreutils applications, it achieves 87.2% reduction. On the nginx server it achieves 80.3% reduction with 2% slowdown. We also provide a gadget chain-breaking study across all applications, and show that our framework breaks the shell-spawning chain in all cases.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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