现代代码重用攻击充分利用了臃肿的软件。攻击者将原本无害的代码中的短指令序列拼凑在一起,以执行恶意操作。消除这些可重用的代码片段(称为小工具)已成为减少攻击面的主要关注点之一。其目的是打破这些小工具链,从而使这种代码重用攻击不可能或不太常见。先前关于攻击面减少的工作通常试图通过对应用程序进行子集化来消除此类攻击,例如,通过用户指定的输入、配置或功能,或者通过关注第三方库来实现对应用程序干扰最小的高小工具减少。在这项工作中,我们提出了一个通用的,整个程序的攻击面减少技术称为OCA,显着减少小工具,并有轻微的性能下降。OCA不需要用户输入,并保持所有功能不变。OCA识别特定的程序点,并通过分析确定在运行时启用/禁用的关键功能集。因此,运行时系统在执行期间控制启用的函数的集合,从而显著减少攻击者可以使用的活动小工具的集合,并且通过扩展,显著地减少活动小工具链的集合。在SPEC CPU 2017上,我们的框架实现了73.2%的小工具减少,平均速度仅为4%。在10个GNU coreutils应用程序上,它实现了87.2%的减少。在nginx服务器上,它实现了80.3%的减少和2%的减速。我们还提供了一个小工具链打破所有应用程序的研究,并表明,我们的框架打破了壳产卵链在所有情况下。
英文摘要:
Modern code reuse attacks are taking full advantage of bloated software. Attackers piece together short sequences of instructions in otherwise benign code to carry out malicious actions. Eliminating these reusable code snippets, known as gadgets, has become one of the prime concerns of attack surface reduction. The aim is to break these chains of gadgets, thereby making such code reuse attacks impossible or substantially less common. Previous work on attack surface reduction has typically tried to eliminate such attacks by subsetting the application, e.g. via user-specified inputs, configurations, or features, or by focusing on third-party libraries to achieve high gadget reductions with minimal interference to the application.
In this work we present a general, whole-program attack surface reduction technique called OCA that significantly reduces gadgets and has minor performance degradation. OCA requires no user inputs and leaves all features intact. OCA identifies specific program points and through analysis determines key function sets to enable/disable at runtime. The runtime system, thus, controls the set of enabled functions during execution, thereby significantly reducing the set of active gadgets an attacker can use, and by extension, cutting down the set of active gadget chains dramatically. On SPEC CPU 2017, our framework achieves 73.2% total gadget reduction with only 4% average slowdown. On 10 GNU coreutils applications, it achieves 87.2% reduction. On the nginx server it achieves 80.3% reduction with 2% slowdown. We also provide a gadget chain-breaking study across all applications, and show that our framework breaks the shell-spawning chain in all cases.
LoadLord: Loading on the Fly to Defend Against Code-Reuse Attacks
代码重用攻击是一种常见的攻击方法,攻击者利用程序中已有的代码来劫持控制流。大多数现有的防御集中在控制流完整性(CFI),代码随机化和软件解浮动。然而,那些确保如此高的安全性,大多数细粒度的方案遭受显着的性能开销,并仅减少攻击面,如软件解浮动不能完全抵御代码重用攻击。本文从压缩运行时可用代码空间的角度出发,提出了LoadLord,在程序运行过程中动态加载并及时卸载函数,以抵御代码重用攻击。LoadLord可以减少内存中小工具的数量,尤其是高风险的小工具。此外,LoadLord确保了加载过程的控制流完整性,并打破了构建小工具链的必要条件。我们在Linux操作系统上实现了LoadLord,并在仅限制原功能1/16的情况下进行了实验。因此,LoadLord可以防御代码重用攻击,并且在SPEC CPU 2006上的平均运行时开销为1.7%,减少了94.02%的小工具。
RevPRAG: Revealing Poisoning Attacks in Retrieval-Augmented Generation through LLM Activation Analysis
School of Computer Science, Fudan University(复旦大学计算机科学学院);Department of Computer Science, Worcester Polytechnic Institute(沃思堡理工学院计算机科学系);Institute of Big Data, Fudan University(复旦大学大数据研究院)
GUARD-SLM: Token Activation-Based Defense Against Jailbreak Attacks for Small Language Models
Knight Foundation School of Computing and Information Sciences(奈特基金会计算与信息科学学院);Security, Optimization, and Learning for InterDependent networks laboratory (solid lab)(安全、优化与相互依赖网络学习实验室);Florida International University(佛罗里达国际大学)
InverTune: Removing Backdoors from Multimodal Contrastive Learning Models via Trigger Inversion and Activation Tuning
1 School of Cyber Science;Engineering, Wuhan University 0.3em 2 School of Computer Science, Wuhan University 0.3em 3 Institute for Math \& AI, Wuhan University
Activation-Guided Local Editing for Jailbreaking Attacks
Beihang University(北航);Hangzhou Innovation Institute(杭州创新研究院);HKUST(香港科技大学);South China University of Technology(华南理工大学);Nanyang Technological University(南洋理工大学);Kunming University of Science and Technology(昆明理工大学)
A No-Defense Defense Against Gradient-Based Adversarial Attacks on ML-NIDS: Is Less More?
Carleton University(卡尔顿大学);Computer Engineering Carleton University Ottawa, Canada(计算机工程系卡尔顿大学渥太华加拿大);School of Information Technology Carleton University Ottawa, Canada(信息科技学院卡尔顿大学渥太华加拿大)
Erasing Self-Supervised Learning Backdoor by Cluster Activation Masking
State Key Laboratory of Multimodal Artificial Intelligence Systems, Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of Sciences(中国科学院自动化研究所 多模态人工智能系统国家重点实验室);University of Chinese Academy of Sciences(中国科学院大学);Xiaomi Inc.(小米公司);State Key Laboratory of CNS/ATM, Beihang University(北京航空航天大学 CNS/ATM 国家重点实验室);College of Computer Science, Inner Mongolia University(内蒙古大学 计算机学院)
Nearest is Not Dearest: Towards Practical Defense against Quantization-conditioned Backdoor Attacks
The State Key Laboratory of Blockchain and Data Security, Zhejiang University(浙江大学区块链与数据安全国家重点实验室);School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Wuhan University(武汉大学网络安全学院);School of Computer Science and Engineering, Central South University(中南大学计算机科学与工程学院);X Digital Dynamics(X数字动力公司);Tencent Data Platform(腾讯数据平台)