针对移动设备上隐蔽信道与应用画像的传感器复用侧信道分析
A Side-channel Analysis of Sensor Multiplexing for Covert Channels and Application Profiling on Mobile Devices
AI总结：
本研究发现Android传感器复用设计存在侧信道漏洞，无特权恶意应用可通过频率键移构建隐蔽信道绕过安全机制，还能粗粒度画像其他活跃的传感器启用应用，揭示了其传感器协议栈的设计安全隐患。
摘要：
移动设备通常采用软件复用机制，将物理传感器的测量数据分发给多个应用。在Android设备上，即便部分应用请求更低的采样频率，系统也会将所有应用请求中的最高采样频率返回给全部应用。本文全面证明，这一设计选择会带来可实际利用的侧信道，其利用方式为频率键移技术。通过在软件中精心调制传感器采样频率，我们展示了无特权恶意应用如何构建可靠的频谱隐蔽信道，从而绕过现有安全机制。此外，我们提出了一种新型变体方法，可让无特权恶意应用对其他处于活跃状态、启用了传感器的应用进行粗粒度画像。这两种方法除了访问开发者可获取的标准移动服务外，无需任何特殊假设。因此，本工作揭示了利用Android传感器协议栈中细微但不安全的设计选择所形成的侧信道漏洞。
英文摘要：
Mobile devices often distribute measurements from physical sensors to multiple applications using software multiplexing. On Android devices, the highest requested sampling frequency is returned to all applications, even if others request measurements at lower frequencies. In this paper, we comprehensively demonstrate that this design choice exposes practically exploitable side-channels using frequency-key shifting. By carefully modulating sensor sampling frequencies in software, we show how unprivileged malicious applications can construct reliable spectral covert channels that bypass existing security mechanisms. Additionally, we present a novel variant that allows an unprivileged malicious application to profile other active, sensor-enabled applications at a coarse-grained level. Both methods do not impose any special assumptions beyond accessing standard mobile services available to developers. As such, our work reports side-channel vulnerabilities that exploit subtle yet insecure design choices in Android sensor stacks.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
