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arXiv 2110.04795cs.CR
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QROM中基于同源的群签名和可追责环签名

Isogeny-based Group Signatures and Accountable Ring Signatures in QROM

Kai-Min Chung, Yao-Ching Hsieh, Mi-Ying Huang, Yu-Hsuan Huang, Tanja Lange, Bo-Yin Yang

AI总结:

通过引入可开放sigma协议,本文提出了QROM中首个可证明安全的基于同源的群签名和可追责环签名,免疫FSwA缺陷并为后量子密码提供非格替代方案。

摘要:

我们提出了量子随机预言机模型(QROM)中首个可证明安全的基于同源的群签名(GS)和可追责环签名(ARS)。我们通过引入并构建一种称为可开放sigma协议的中间原语,并证明任何此类协议都能产生安全的GS和ARS来实现这一点。此外,如果满足额外的完美唯一响应属性(通过我们量身定制的构造实现),则可以保证QROM安全性。Beullens等人先前的工作(Eurocrypt 2022,Asiacrypt 2020)提出了效率更高的基于同源的GS和ARS,但仅在经典随机预言机模型(CROM)中进行了分析。众所周知,CROM安全性通常不能转化为QROM安全性;随着基于同源的构造在后量子密码学中的相关性日益增加,目前的最新进展并不令人满意。此外,上述现有的基于同源的签名最近受到Barbosa等人和Devevey等人(CRYPTO 2023)发现的带弃权(不执行)的Fiat-Shamir(FSwA)缺陷的影响,使得基于同源的签名的可证明安全性再次受到质疑。我们的构造不仅对FSwA缺陷免疫,而且提供了更强的QROM安全性。由于当前QROM安全的ARS和GS方案大多基于格,如果格假设被削弱,我们提供了一个稳健的后量子替代方案。

英文摘要:

We present the first provably secure isogeny-based group signature (GS) and accountable ring signature (ARS) in the quantum random oracle model (QROM). We do so via introducing and constructing an intermediate primitive called the openable sigma protocol and demonstrating that any such protocol gives rise to a secure GS and ARS. Furthermore, QROM security is guaranteed if an additional perfect unique-response property (which is achieved via our tailored construction) is satisfied. Previous works by Beullens et al. (Eurocrypt 2022, Asiacrypt 2020) proposed isogeny-based GS and ARS with better efficiency but were only analyzed in the classical random oracle model (CROM). It is well-known that CROM security does not generally translate to QROM security; with the growing relevance of isogeny-based constructions in post-quantum cryptography, the current state of the art is unsatisfactory. Moreover, the aforementioned existing isogeny-based signatures were recently affected by the Fiat-Shamir with aborts (FSwA) flaw discovered by Barbosa et al. and Devevey et al. (CRYPTO 2023), leaving the provable security of isogeny-based signatures open to question once again. Our constructions are not only immune to the FSwA flaw but also provide stronger QROM security. As current QROM-secure ARS and GS schemes are mostly lattice-based, we offer a robust post-quantum alternative should lattice assumptions weaken.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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