在共同资源的系统可持续性博弈中从共同目标中出现合作
The emergence of cooperation from shared goals in the Systemic Sustainability Game of common pool resources
摘要:
由于可能过度开发,可持续利用共有资源是环境治理的一项重大挑战。这一领域的研究忽略了用户决策和资源动态之间的反馈。在这里,我们开发了一个在线游戏来执行一组实验,在这些实验中,相同CPR的用户决定他们各自的收获率,这反过来又取决于资源动态。我们表明,如果用户有共同的目标,高水平的自组织合作出现,导致长期的资源可持续性。否则,自私/个人主义行为会导致资源枯竭(“公地悲剧”)。为了解释这些结果,我们开发了一个基于最优控制理论的耦合资源决策动态的分析模型,并展示了这个框架是如何再现实证结果的。
英文摘要:
The sustainable use of common-pool resources (CPRs) is a major environmental governance challenge because of their possible over-exploitation. Research in this field has overlooked the feedback between user decisions and resource dynamics. Here we develop an online game to perform a set of experiments in which users of the same CPR decide on their individual harvesting rates, which in turn depend on the resource dynamics. We show that, if users share common goals, a high level of self-organized cooperation emerges, leading to long-term resource sustainability. Otherwise, selfish/individualistic behaviors lead to resource depletion ("Tragedy of the Commons"). To explain these results, we develop an analytical model of coupled resource-decision dynamics based on optimal control theory and show how this framework reproduces the empirical results.
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