下游古诺垄断供应链的战略库存
Strategic Inventories in a Supply Chain with Downstream Cournot Duopoly
摘要：
供应链中作为影响竞争对手的战略工具的库存被称为战略库存。我们提出了一个两阶段的博弈论供应链模型，其中一个单一的制造商提供产品给一对完全相同的古诺双寡头零售商。研究结果表明，在动态契约下，零售商所承担的SI对于制造商、零售商、消费者、渠道和社会都是帕累托占优的。我们还发现，当制造商签订批发合同或库存持有成本过高时，零售商的SI可以被消除。在比较有和没有下游竞争的情况下，我们还表明，下游古诺双寡头垄断损害了零售商的利润，但有利于所有其他人。
英文摘要：
The inventories carried in a supply chain as a strategic tool to influence the competing firms are considered to be strategic inventories (SI). We present a two-period game-theoretic supply chain model, in which a singular manufacturer supplies products to a pair of identical Cournot duopolistic retailers. We show that the SI carried by the retailers under dynamic contract is Pareto-dominating for the manufacturer, retailers, consumers, the channel, and the society as well. We also find that the retailer's SI, however, can be eliminated when the manufacturer commits wholesale contract or inventory holding cost is too high. In comparing the cases with and without downstream competition, we also show that the downstream Cournot duopoly undermines the retailers in profits, but benefits all others.
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