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arXiv 2109.06127cs.CR
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恶意软件MultiVerse:从自动逻辑炸弹识别到自动修补和跟踪

Malware MultiVerse: From Automatic Logic Bomb Identification to Automatic Patching and Tracing

Marcus Botacin, André Grégio

摘要:

恶意软件和其他可疑软件通常将行为和组件隐藏在逻辑炸弹和上下文敏感的执行路径之后。发现这些路径对于应对现代威胁至关重要,但目前的解决方案还没有准备好以完全自动化的方式检测这些路径。为了弥合这一差距,我们提出了恶意软件多重宇宙(MalVerse),一个解决方案,能够检查多个执行路径,通过符号执行,旨在发现函数输入和返回,触发恶意行为。MalVerse会自动为上下文敏感函数打上已识别符号值的补丁,以允许在传统沙箱中执行软件。我们在angr之上实现了MalVerse,并使用一组Linux和Windows规避示例对其进行了评估。我们发现MalVerse能够为最常见的规避技术(例如,ptrace检查)。

英文摘要:

Malware and other suspicious software often hide behaviors and components behind logic bombs and context-sensitive execution paths. Uncovering these is essential to react against modern threats, but current solutions are not ready to detect these paths in a completely automated manner. To bridge this gap, we propose the Malware Multiverse (MalVerse), a solution able to inspect multiple execution paths via symbolic execution aiming to discover function inputs and returns that trigger malicious behaviors. MalVerse automatically patches the context-sensitive functions with the identified symbolic values to allow the software execution in a traditional sandbox. We implemented MalVerse on top of angr and evaluated it with a set of Linux and Windows evasive samples. We found that MalVerse was able to generate automatic patches for the most common evasion techniques (e.g., ptrace checks).

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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