PARIOT：面向物联网固件完整性的防重打包方案
PARIOT: Anti-Repackaging for IoT Firmware Integrity
AI总结：
本文提出PARIOT自保护方案，通过将防篡改控制直接注入物联网固件，在无需外部信任锚的情况下实现运行时重打包攻击检测，并在50个真实固件样本上验证了其可行性与鲁棒性。
摘要：
物联网重打包是指一种攻击方式，攻击者通过修改合法固件包的内容（例如注入恶意代码）并在外部环境中重新分发，从而破坏固件完整性。在这种场景下，固件交付和更新过程在确保固件完整性方面发挥着核心作用。不幸的是，现有若干解决方案缺乏适当的完整性验证，使固件暴露于重打包攻击之下。即使具备完整性验证，这些方案仍然需要外部信任锚（例如签名密钥或安全存储技术），这可能限制它们在资源受限环境中的采用。此外，最先进的框架并未覆盖整个固件生产和交付过程，因此无法在整条供应链中保护固件生产者所生成的内容。为了缓解这一问题，本文提出了PARIOT，这是一种面向物联网的新型自保护方案，允许将完整性检查（称为防篡改（AT）控制）直接注入固件中。AT控制能够在运行时检测重打包尝试，而无需外部信任锚或计算开销高昂的系统。PARIOT可以部署在现有最先进解决方案之上，确保与当前物联网生态系统和更新框架的最大兼容性。同时，我们已将该方案实现为PARIOTIC，这是一个用于自动保护C/C++物联网固件的原型。对50个真实固件样本的评估阶段证明了所提方法的可行性，以及其在面对实际重打包攻击时的鲁棒性，且不会改变固件行为或带来严重开销。
英文摘要：
IoT repackaging refers to an attack devoted to tampering with a legitimate firmware package by modifying its content (e.g., injecting some malicious code) and re-distributing it in the wild. In such a scenario, the firmware delivery and update processes play a central role in ensuring firmware integrity. Unfortunately, several existing solutions lack proper integrity verification, exposing firmware to repackaging attacks. If this is not the case, they still require an external trust anchor (e.g., signing keys or secure storage technologies), which could limit their adoption in resource-constrained environments. In addition, state-of-the-art frameworks do not cope with the entire firmware production and delivery process, thereby failing to protect the content generated by the firmware producers through the whole supply chain. To mitigate such a problem, in this paper, we introduce PARIOT, a novel self-protecting scheme for IoT that allows the injection of integrity checks, called anti-tampering (AT) controls, directly into the firmware. The AT controls enable the runtime detection of repackaging attempts without needing external trust anchors or computationally expensive systems. PARIOT can be adopted on top of existing state-of-the-art solutions ensuring the widest compatibility with current IoT ecosystems and update frameworks. Also, we have implemented this scheme into PARIOTIC, a prototype to automatically protect C/C++ IoT firmware. The evaluation phase of 50 real-world firmware samples demonstrated the feasibility of the proposed methodology and its robustness against practical repackaging attacks without altering the firmware behavior or severe overheads.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
